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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH: MILLY O. BERNARD, Chairman; 
OLOF E. ZUNDEL, Commissioner; and 
KENNETH RIGTRUP, Commissioner, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
No. 15701 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In the proceedings below, The Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell") petitioned the Utah 
Public Service Commission to approve tariffs and a plan for 
long term leases of Mountain Bell's Dimension 400 PBX and cer-
tain other lines of business telephone terminal equipment all 
of which are offered to business customers in competition with 
private, unregulated equipment vendors and lessors. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
On December 2, 1977, after extensive hearings, the Com-
mission entered its final Report and Order approving Mountain 
Bell's petition. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Mountain Bell seeks an affirmance of the final 
Report and Order by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant has stated the procedural history of these pro-
ceedings in its brief. Mountain Bell will state additional 
facts of record in connection with its argument of various 
issues. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On December 2, 1977 the Public Service Commission of Utah 
entered its final Report and Order in Case No. 76-049-01, ap-
proving several new business 
posed by The Mountain States 
telephone service tariffs pro-
Telephone & Telegraph Company 
[hereinafter "Mountain Bell" or "Respondent"] and rejecting 
Telephone the objections to 
Systems of Utah, 
lant"]. In spite 
those tariffs made 
Inc. 
of 
[hereinafter 
the fact that 
by Business 
"Intervenor" or 
the Appellant 
"Appel-
did not 
timely perfect its appeal, this action has been instituted by 
the Appellant in an attempt to seek judicial review, in the 
nature of certiorari, of the Commission's final decision pur-
suant to Section 54-7-16, Utah Code Annotated (1953), of the 
Public Utilities Act. 
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The Appellant objects to Mountain Bell's two-tier Tela-
Lease payment option which was approved by the Commission for 
business telephone services. The Appellant also objects to 
Mountain Bell's use of incremental costs to identify the rele-
vant, direct cos ts of each business telephone service and to 
the long run incremental analysis developed by Mountain Bell 
to select the rates ultimately approved by the Commission. 
Mountain Bell will show that the Commission's findings and 
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence of record 
and by overwhelming legal authority. In view of the fact that 
this Court has no subject matter jurisdiction in this action, 
Mountain Bell reiterates its request that the Writ of 
Certiorari granted by this Court be dismissed or, in lieu 
thereof, that this Court enter its Order affirming the final 
decision of the Commission. 
II. 
THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THIS PROCEEDING AND THE WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI MUST BE DISMISSED 
A. Procedural Background. 
The Report and Order of the Public Service Commission in 
this matter was entered on December 2, 1977. [R. 1137). An 
Affidavit of Mailing, signed by Gail Grayson, states that 
copies of the Report and Order were mailed on the same date to 
Mr. Bruce P. Saypol at 1920 L. Street N.W., Washington D.C. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20086, counsel for the Appellant. [R. 1136) 
Section 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) provides, in 
pertinent part: 
54-7-15. Rehearings--Necessary before recourse to 
courts--Stay.--After any order or decision has been 
made by the commission any party to the action or 
proceeding • • may apply for a rehearing in re-
spect to any matters determined in said action or 
proceeding • and the commission may grant and 
hold such rehearing No cause of action 
arising out of any order or decision of the com-
mission shall accrue in any court to any corporation 
or person unless such corporation or person shall 
have made application to the commission for a re-
hearing before the effective date of such order or 
decision, or, if such order or decision becomes 
effective prior to twenty days after its date, be-
fore twenty days after the order or decision. 
(emphasis added). 
The Report and Order was silent with respect to an effective 
date. Therefore, the last day for filing an application for 
rehearing with the Commission was December 22, 1977, "twenty 
days after the order." 
However, it was not until January 4, 1978, that the Ap-
pellant finally filed an Application for Rehearing with the 
Commission [ R. 1148]. There is no question that the Appli-
cation was untimely. In the Application itself, the Appellant 
requested "that this Application be considered by the Commis-
sion, even though it is being submitted shortly after the ex-
piration of the statutory period for the filing of Applica-
tions for Rehearing." [R. 1148). The Appellant explained 
that its counsel learned of the Report and Order by telephone 
and called the Secretary of the Commission to request a copy 
-4-
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that was ultimately received on December 16, 1977. [R. 1148). 
On January 30, 1978, the Commission denied the Appel-
lant's Application for Rehearing because it was untimely and 
also on the merits. The Appellant thereupon filed its Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari on March 1, 1978. 
On May 30, 1978, Mountain Bell filed a Motion to Dismiss 
the Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on the 
ground that this Court has no jurisdiction over the Commis-
sion 's Report and Order because the Appellant failed to per-
feet its appeal pursuant to statute. This Motion was denied 
after it was heard together with several other related 
motions, all of which were argued extensively by Mountain Bell 
and other parties before the Court. Mountain Bell respect-
fully submits this issue to the Court's attention again be-
cause it is appropriate that the Court take notice of its want 
of jurisdiction at any time in a proceeding and it seems quite 
clear that the untimeliness of the Application for Rehearing 
precludes jurisdiction over the Commission's Report and Order 
by this Court. 
B. The Court's Prior Disposition 
Motion to DiSiiiTSS Should Not 
Determination of This Issue.~-
of Mountain Bell's 
be Deemed a Final 
If minor differences between this Court's and the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's administration of petitions for writs 
of certiorari are disregarded, the case at bar is almost 
exactly analogous to Clemmons :::!..!.. Railroad Commission of ~ 
-5-
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of California, 173 Cal. 254, 159 P. 713 (1916). The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had issued an order to show cause why a 
writ of certiorari should not be granted to review an order of 
the California Railroad Commission. The Railroad Commission 
had denied an application for rehearing "on various grounds, 
one of them being that the application had not been presented 
within the time allowed by law." 159 P. at 713. In response 
to the order to show cause, the Commission objected that the 
writ should not issue because of the untimely application for 
rehearing. Nevertheless, the Court issued the writ. 
The petitioners apparently contended that the issuance of 
the writ had disposed of the question of the Court's jurisdic-
tion once and for all. The Court disagreed: 
Notwithstanding our order that a writ issue, 
the respondents are not precluded from continuing to 
insist, as they do, upon their preliminary objection 
raised in response to the order to show cause. In 
ordering the issuance of the writ of certiorari we 
did not finally pass upon the merits of this objec-
tion. In any event, the point goes to the juris-
diction of the court, and it may, therefore be 
raised at an stage of the proceedin s. 
159 P. at 713 emphasis added • 
See, also, Dixie Stockgrowers' Bank ~ Washington County, 81 
Utah 429, 19 P.2d 388 (1933) (Court may notice want of juris-
diction from the record without a motion by either party). 
c. The Appellant's Failure to File ~ Timely Application 
for Rehearing Precludes Review of the Report and 
Order £1. This Court. 
In Bowen Trucking, Inc. !..!.. Public Service Commission, 559 
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P.2d 954 (Utah 1977), this Court declared that a timely appli-
cation for rehearing is a necessary precondition to its 
jurisdiction to review orders of the Public Service Commis-
sion: 
In Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Service 
Commission we observe-a--that Sec. 54-7-15 was 
patterned after the Public Utilities Act of 
California of 1915, Deerings General Laws of 
California, 1915, Act 2886, Sec. 66. We followed 
the general rule that where statutes of other states 
are adopted, it is assumed the construction placed 
thereon by the courts of such state was also 
adopted. 
The California courts have interpreted their 
statute (Sec. 66), which is of similar import to 
Sec. 5 4-7-15, to mean that upon failure of a party 
to make a timely application for rehearing, there-
after the party is precluded from seeking a review 
of the action of the Commission in any Court. 
559 P.2d at 956 (emphasis added). 
The Court cited Clemmons, supra, and other California cases in 
support of this statement. In Clemmons the California Supreme 
Court said: 
[S]ince application for rehearing was not made until 
29 days after [the effective date of the order], it 
follows that the petitioners have lost their right 
to apply to this court, or to any court of this 
state, for a review of the action of the commission. 
159 P. at 714. 
The applicable Utah statutes are substantially identical to 
the statutes construed in Clemmons. Both require timely 
application for rehearing as a necessary prerequisite to a 
petition for a writ of certiorari to review an order of the 
Commission and both require that it be filed before the order 
becomes effective or before twenty days from the date of the 
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order. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Ohio, construing rehear-
ing and review statutes structured on the same pattern as 
Utah's and California's, has held that "an application for 
rehearing within the prescribed time is a prerequisite for 
review by this court." Warner v. Ohio Edison Co., 152 Ohio 
St. 303, 89 N.E.2d 463, 466 (1949) (emphasis added). Cf. Utah 
Power ! Light Company y. Federal Power Commission, 339 F. 2d 
436 (10th Cir. 1964); Scherer Freight Lines, Inc. y. Illinois 
Commerce Commission, 24 Ill. 2d 359, 181 N.E.2d 134 (1962). 
In its Application for Rehearing, the Appellant seems to 
imply that it is relieved from its duty to comply with Section 
54-7-15, U.C.A., because it did not receive a copy of the 
Report and Order until December 16, 1977. The statute nowhere 
either expressly or impliedly makes such an exception to its 
provisions. Rather, it speaks directly in terms of the date 
of an order or the effective date of an order. Section 
54-7-15, U.C.A. Indeed, the statutes make provision for the 
service of orders only upon "the corporation or person ~ 
plained of, or his or its attorney." Section 54-7-10, u.c.A. 
(emphasis added). Even though the Affidavit of Mailing indi-
cates that the Commission's secretary attempted to serve the 
Appellant, there is no similar provision requiring the service 
of notice of the entry of orders on intervenors. Rather, an 
Order need only "be in writing and entered upon the records of 
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the commission." Section 54-7-5, U.C.A. 
The Appellant cannot extend the time it is afforded to 
apply for rehearing by inattention to proceedings. In Amer-
~ Fruit Growers ~· Lewis 12_. Goldstein f !_ R_ Corp., 78 F. 
Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1948) the complainant had no actual notice 
of an order en t e red on Au gu s t 6 , 1 9 4 7 u n ti 1 August 1 1 • He 
sought review of the order on appeal. The governing statute 
granted a right to appeal "within 30 days from • • • the date 
of [an] order" (78 F. Supp. at 311) and the appeal was timely 
thereunder only if the pertinent date could be extended to the 
date upon which the complainant received notice. The court 
held that the statute referred to the date of the order, not 
the date on which notice of the entry of the order was re-
ceived, and dismissed the appeal, stating: 
That the respondent received notice of the order on 
August 11, 1947, five days after it was made will 
not help it. The Act does not require that the 
Secretary shall give notice to the parties or that 
the time for filing an appeal shall begin to run 
from the receipt of such notice. Consequently a 
duty is cast upon the litigants to watch the prog::-
ress of their case. 
78 F. Supp. at 311 (emphasis added). 
Rule 77(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that "[l)ack of notice of the entry [of an order] by the clerk 
does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the 
court to relieve a party for failure to appeal within the time 
allowed." The rationale underlying Rule 77(d) applies equally 
to the orders of the Public Service Commission. The finality 
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of such orders is as important as the finality of judgments 
and this policy should be as free as possible from the uncer-
tainties that litigants' excuses and explanations would 
entail. Moreover, Section 54-7-16, U.C.A., expressly states 
that "[t]he provisions of the [Rules] of Civil Procedure 
relating to writs or review shall so far as applicable • 
apply to proceedings instituted in the Supreme Court [by 
petition for writ of certiorari to the Public Service Com-
mission]." 
This Court's power to review orders of the Public Service 
Commission was created by the legislature subject to certain 
limits and conditions. Among the necessary conditions which 
the Appellant failed to meet in these proceedings is the re-
quirement that a timely application for rehearing be made to 
the Commission. Because this Court has no jurisdiction over 
the subject matter, the Writ of Certiorari granted pursuant to 
the petition of the Appellant, and these proceedings, should 
be dismissed. 
III. 
THE STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF 
REVIEW DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
COMMISSION'S REPORT AND ORDER MUST BE AFFIRMED 
The Brief of the Appellant suggests standards for the re-
view of the Commission's Report and Order that are clearly 
contrary to the decisions of this Court. Moreover, throughout 
its brief the Appellant complains that the findings made by 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Commission are not to its liking, although it never argues 
that they are not sufficient to support the Commission's 
Order. 
The test is not, as the Appellant suggests, whether the 
Commission's Order comports with "the manifest weight of the 
evidence" or is correct "in view of the reliable, probative, 
and substantial evidence in the whole record." (Appellant's 
Brief at 10). Upon review of an order of the Commission pur-
suant to Sec. 54-7-16, U.C.A., this Court has declared: 
[I]t is not required that facts found by the Com-
mission be conclusively established or shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence. The scope of review 
is limited to an ascertainment of whether the Com-
mission had before it competent evidence upon which 
to base its decision. 
Ashworth Transfer Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 2 Uta11 2d 23, 28, 268 P.2d 990 
(1954). 
Similarly, an "essential finding" of the Commission will stand 
on this Court's review unless "there is no substantial 
evidence to support [it]." Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Commission, 105 Utah 266, 145 
P.2d 790, 792 (1944) (emphasis added). In Mulcahy y. Public 
Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 117 P.2d 298 (1941), the 
Court said: 
If there is in the record competent evidence from 
which a reasonable mind could believe or conclude 
that a certain fact existed, a finding of such fact 
finds justification in the evidence and we can not 
disturb it. 
117 P.2d at 299. 
In its Brief, the Appellant argues as if Mountain Bell 
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presented no evidence to the Commission except for what the 
Appellant deems a few telling points on the cross-examination 
of Mountain Bell's witnesses. As the remaining sections of 
this brief demonstrate, the record contains ample competent 
evidence to support the Commission's findings and Order even 
if the standard for review were as the Appellant states it. 
But, of course, the burden on the Appellant before this Court 
is not only to show that it presented some competent evidence 
contrary to the Commission's findings and Order, but also to 
show that Mountain Bell presented no competent evidence in 
support of them. 
The Appellant's complaints about the findings do not go 
to their sufficiency to support the Order but only to their 
form. In its brief, the Appellant says: "it is absolutely 
impossible to determine the reasoning processes which led the 
Commission to reach its conclusions" (Appellant's Brief at 9); 
that "[i]t remains impossible to ascertain how or why the 
Commission reached its 'findings and conclusions' " 
(Appellant's Brief at 27); and that "none of the intricacies 
of [or conflicts between] • the costing methodologies 
is referenced, much less resolved by the Commission." 
(Appellant's Brief at 35 and 41). 
If the Appellant means to suggest that more elaborate and 
detailed findings should have been made, it is contradicted by 
the one statement this Court has made on the subject. In 
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Logan City ~· Public Utilities Commission, 77 Utah 442, 296 P. 
1006 (1931), it is said, in a concurring opinion, that 
[F]inal orders of the Commission should not be dis-
turbed because it may be thought the findings are 
not as full or complete as they should be, unless it 
appears that the order was based on wrong • 
principles of law, or • is not sufficiently sup-
ported by the evidence. 
296 P. at 1011 (Straup, J., concurring). 
Justice Straup thought that the expressly stated findings in 
the Logan City case might not have been wholly sufficient to 
support the order therein, but that, since the record would 
have supported the necessary findings that were not expressly 
stated, the order should not be disturbed. 296 P.2d at 1011. 
Nothing in this Court's opinions or this State's statutes 
suggests that minute and elaborate findings are either neces-
sary or appropriate. The entire record of the proceedings be-
fore the Commission has been certified to the Court, and it is 
entirely adequate to display the evidence and the ra.tionale 
for the Commission's determination. 
IV. 
THE CONCEPT OF THE BUSINESS TERMINAL TELEPHONE 
SERVICE OFFERINGS IN THIS PROCEEDING 
On September 1, 1976 the Respondent filed its Petition 
with the Public Service Commission for the purpose of making 
available to Utah business telephone customers a new private 
branch exchange (PBX) service known as Dimension 400 PBX [ R • 
1063). On November 5, 1976 the Respondent filed its Petition 
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to make available a new member of the ComKey family of fixed 
key terminal telephone sets known as the ComKey 2152 [R. 
1094]. Finally, on October 15, 1976 the Respondent proposed 
to restructure the manner in which business terminal telephone 
equipment was to be provided by the Company in the State of 
Utah [R. 1077]. These matters were collectively considered by 
the Commission in P.S.C. Case No. 76-049-01. Hearings were 
conducted by the Commission on November 29 and 30, 1976 and on 
December 1 and 2, 1976. These proposals were the subject of 
further extensive examination and scrutiny in hearings begin-
ning on February and concluding on February 8, 1977. A 
final full day hearing was held by the Commission in August, 
1977 to consider all of the written objections raised under 
the antitrust laws by the State Attorney General. Three addi-
tional months of Commission deliberation followed and on De-
cember 2, 1977 the Commission entered its final Report and 
Order in this matter generally approving the Respondent's pro-
posals and rejecting the objections raised by the Appellant 
and the Attorney General [R. 1137). 
It is important that this Court recognize the political 
and economic bases underlying the controversy between Mountain 
Bell (Respondent) and the Intervenor (Appellant) in this pro-
ceeding. The parties are competitors in providing terminal 
telephone equipment and systems to the public consumer. The 
Appellant is a member of a large national trade association of 
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private unregulated vendors, lessors, and manufacturers of 
telephone equipment known as the North American Telephone 
Association (NATA) [R. 585). The Appellant is being repre-
sented in this case not principally by local counsel but by 
Cohn & Marks of Washington, D. C., the national counsel for 
NATA. Mr. Saypol and his witnesses have participated in sim-
ilar state commission proceedings throughout the nation, rep-
resenting association members of NATA [R. 581-83). The issues 
and objections which they have raised in this proceeding are 
substantially the same issues and the same objections sup-
ported by the same testimony and exhibits that have been 
raised in the other state proceedings since 1975. In the vast 
majority of those states, the Appellant's objections have been 
flatly rejected as unfounded and not supported by any credible 
evidence. Two commission decisions have been appealed by the 
local intervenor represented by Cohn & Marks in an attempt to 
obtain a reversal of the commissions' decisions. In both ap-
peals, the Courts flatly rejected the intervenors' position. 
In re Tele/Resources, Inc., 58 App. Div. 2d 406, 396 N.Y.S.2d 
906 ( 1977); Atlantic Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commis-
~. 390 A.2d 439 (D.C. App. 1978). 
The matter of competition in the provision of business 
terminal telephone equipment is mandated by federal law in a 
long line of decisions issued by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) over the years. See, Hush-A-Phone Corp. y. 
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United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); In The Matter of 
Carterphone, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 ( 1968); Telerent Leasing Corp., 
45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974), aff'd, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027; Mebane Mobile Home Telephone Co., 
Docket No. 20476 (FCC Decision No. 75-534, June 4, 1975). In 
each of those decisions, the FCC sought to establish the fun-
damental precept that there shall be free, fair, and open com-
petition among all suppliers and vendors of business terminal 
telephone equipment. The FCC concluded in its Telerent deci-
sion that state utilities commissions could not unfairly ob-
struct or restrain the efforts of private unregulated suppli-
ers and vendors to compete for the business customer in the 
telephone marketplace. However, those same unregulated ven-
dors, such as the Appellant in this proceeding, have used and 
are using the FCC shield to demand obstruction of the efforts 
of Bell operating companies to compete fairly and effectively. 
[R. 581-83). 
In this proceeding the Appellant has chosen to appeal two 
of the principal issues in controversy. The Appellant and its 
trade association co-members market telephone equipment at 
prices and upon terms and conditions of their own choosing. 
[R. 1180-81]. These unregulated vendors typically offer the 
equipment on the basis of long-term leases or outright sales 
together with separate maintenance agreements. In response to 
customer demand, Mountain Bell offers to business telephone 
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customers two payment plans for PBX and fixed key telephone 
systems: ( 1) the conventional month-to-month payment plan to 
which the Appellant does not object since it does not offer a 
comparable month-to-month plan, and (2) a payment plan known 
as the two-tier TelaLease payment option which is competitive 
with private vendors' long-term leases. Not surprisingly, the 
Appellant vigorously objects to Mountain Bell's competitive 
TelaLease payment option and asks this Court to find that the 
payment plan is objectionable, in spite of the fact that such 
action by this Court would restrain competition and reduce the 
choices of payment plans available to the Utah business cus-
tomer, and in spite of the fact that the record shows the two-
tier payment option is effective in all eight of the Mountain 
Bell states and in 46 of 48 states served by the Bell System 
[R. 1215-16]. 
The second principal issue raised by the Appellant re-
lates to the propriety of the cost studies which underlie the 
tariffs that the Commission approved. The Respondent utilized 
recognized studies to calculate the incremental costs of of-
fering each of the items of equipment which were the subject 
of this proceeding and to verify that the market prices se-
lected for them substantially exceeded costs. [R. 885-86]. 
The Appellant argued that the Commission should order the Re-
spondent to calculate costs based upon a so-called "fully dis-
tributed cost" methodology. The Commission rejected the 
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Appellant's unsupported theory, but, based upon the evidence 
of record, concluded that the Respondent's rates exceeded not 
only incremental costs but fully distributed costs as well. 
The Appellant's continuing objection to the Respondent's cost 
methodology is rendered moot by this conclusion. Many state 
regulatory commissions have similarly been unpersuaded by the 
Appellant's argument. 
Much of the evidence of record in support of many of the 
Commission's findings stands unrebutted. Where the evidence 
was conflicting, the Commission found in favor of the Respon-
dent. Substantial evidence of record exists to support the 
Commission's findings and conclusions. This Court has re-
peatedly declared that its scope of review of decisions of the 
Commission extends only as far as is necessary to determine 
that there is substantial evidence to sustain the findings and 
decisions of the Commission. Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Public 
~~ ~~ ~ -
Service Commission, 11 Utah 2d 121, 355 P.2d 706 (1960); Los 
Angeles & S.L.R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 80 Utah 
455, 15 P.2d 358 (1932); Salt Lake City y. Utah Light ! Trac-
tion Co., 52 Utah 210, 173 P. 556 (1918). It was apparent to 
the Commission and it will be apparent to this Court that sub-
stantial evidence exists to sustain each of the Commission's 
findings and conclusions in its final Report and Order. 
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v. 
THE TWO-TIER TELALEASE PAYMENT OPTION IS NOT 
ILLEGAL, DISCRIMINATORY, OR ANTICOMPETITIVE AND IT 
PROVIDES A NECESSARY AND RESPONSIBLE OPTIONAL PAYMENT 
PLAN WHICH IS OF SUBSTANTIAL VALUE TO THE UTAH 
BUSINESS TELEPHONE CUSTOMER 
A. The Unrebutted Evidence of Record Demonstrates That 
the Utah Business TelephOne Customer Requires and 
Demands That Mountain Bell Offer the Two-Tier 
TelaLease-payment Option. 
Traditionally, Mountain Bell offered all business tele-
phone services only on a conventional month-to-month payment 
plan. The monthly prices for these services were "average" 
prices designed to cover a broad range of customer conditions 
and costs. [R. 49, 50; Applicant's Exhibit 3). The average 
price was designed to cover the costs of both high and low 
cost users with the result that low-cost users subsidized 
high-cost users. [R. 51). The unrebutted evidence demon-
strates that monthly costs to serve a customer who keeps his 
telephone system for a short period of time are greater than 
the monthly costs for a customer who keeps his telephone 
system for a longer period. [R. 58; Applicant's Exhibit 3). 
Studies of changes in the marketplace resulting from the 
FCC's mandate for competition show that longer location life 
customers have increasingly turned to private vendors of tele-
phone equipment who offer outright sales and long-term leases 
of business telephone systems. So long as Mountain Bell of-
fered no such comparable payment plans to business customers, 
the trend was toward a divided market with private vendors 
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selling only to the longer location life (and lower cost) cus-
tomer, while the shorter location (and higher cost) customer 
remained with Mountain Bell. The lack of comparable competi-
tive payment options in the market limited the customer's 
choices. 
Mr. Hogstrom of the Division of Public Utilities conceded 
that Mountain Bell's conventional month-to-month payment plan 
failed to meet the mandate for competitive payment options: 
Q. And, so, recognizing that we now have a 
competitive market for PBX and key equipment, do you 
feel that today's month-to-month payment option • 
which is the only method authorized by present 
tariffs for PBX equipment • • meets the needs of 
Mountain Bell and other business customers in the 
State of Utah? 
A. In a general sense I'd probably have to 
agree with you. --it probably doesn't. 
[R. 674] 
Moreover, the unrebutted evidence demonstrates that only 
Mountain Bell has undertaken any market studies in Utah to 
identify the customer's needs and preferences. [R. 33-35, 
50-52; Applicant's Exhibits 3 & 14]. The Appellant conducted 
no market studies and did not dispute the unrebutted evidence 
that the Utah business customer finds the conventional month-
to-month payment plan inadequate, but Appellant nevertheless 
contends that the customer should be denied any terminal 
equipment services from Mountain Bell except on a month-to-
month payment plan. 
In response to the needs and demands of the long-term 
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business customer, Mountain Bell proposed an optional payment 
plan known as the TelaLease in addition to its conventional 
month-to-month payment plan. In Case No. 76-049-01, Mountain 
Bell proposed to make available to Utah business customers the 
two-tier TelaLease payment option for a term of 3, 5, 7, or 10 
years for all PBX (private branch exchange) and fixed key 
telephone systems. In its final Report and Order, based upon 
substantial evidence, the Public Service Commission approved 
Mountain Bell's proposal without hesitation. 
The Appellant represents to this Court that Mountain 
Bell's TelaLease payment option is a "new" and "radical" con-
cept for the Utah Public Service Commission and for the busi-
ness customer of the State of Utah. [Appellant's Brief at 1, 
16-17]. In fact the TelaLease payment option has been avail-
able from Mountain Bell in Utah for several telephone systems 
for many years: since April 11, 1975 for ComKey 718 and 
ComKey 1434 and since November 11, 1975 for Communicator 410. 
Mountain Bell's proposal in this case was to extend the 
availability of this existing and approved payment option to 
more items of business terminal telephone equipment. [R. 46]. 
The Appellant attempts to argue that the TelaLease pay-
ment option is unlawful in that it is exclusionary, anti-
competitive, discriminatory, 
trade. Appellant advances 
preferential, and a restraint of 
each of these contrived and 
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baseless objections for the purpose of denying the Utah busi-
ness customer the right to select among several payment op-
tions for his telephone equipment. Moreover, because the Ap-
pellant views the TelaLease payment option as a competitive 
alternative its own long-term leases, its objections are di-
rected to eliminating this competitive alternative and to in-
sulating private vendors from any market competition whatso-
ever. In seeking a reversal of the Commission's final deci-
sion, the Appellant is urging this Court to limit and restrict 
competition in the State of Utah by depriving the customer of 
competitive payment options for telephone equipment. 
B. The TelaLease Payment Option ~ Designed to Recover 
All Capital and Expense Related Costs. 
When a customer selects the TelaLease payment option in 
lieu of the conventional month-to-month payment plan, his 
monthly payments consist principally of two portions or 
"tiers": capital-related costs and expense-related costs. 
[Applicant's Exhibit 5). "Tier A" is payable over a fixed 
period of 3, 5, 7, or 10 years, depending upon the type of 
terminal equipment provided. At the end of the fixed payment 
period, Tier A payments terminate. "Tier B" runs contempora-
neously with Tier A and continues after Tier A payments end. 
[R. 1078-79). Tier B is composed of a fixed portion and a 
variable portion, both of which are payable throughout the 
period the customer retains the service. [R. 69). 
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Tier A and the fixed continuing portion of Tier B have 
been designed to recover each i tern of equipment's capital-
rela ted costs plus a contribution (analogous to profit). [R. 
69, 1078]. The continuing fixed portion of Tier B has been 
expressly designed to provide additional contribution to Moun-
tain Bell's ownership of the equipment. This feature is not 
present in any two-tier payment plan development by AT&T and 
is unique to Mountain Bell. [R. 160). 
Tier A ca pi tal-rela ted prices are subject to change for 
new leases as capital-related costs increase or decrease in 
the future. Under the TelaLease, any increases in the cost of 
acquiring new equipment will be borne by new business custom-
ers through the filing of vintage tariffs. Therefore, al-
though the TelaLease fixes capital costs borne by the customer 
in Tier A and in the constant fixed portion of Tier B pay-
ments, rate adjustments to reflect increased capital costs may 
be implemented by the Public Service Commission at any time 
for prospective TelaLease customers by authorizing a new vin-
tage tariff. [R. 70, 165, 1079). 
The variable portion of Tier B is designed to recover 
non-capital costs such as maintenance and overhead, together 
with additional contribution. [R. 1078-79]. Since the items 
of cost and expense which it is designed to cover are vari-
able, Tier B charges can be changed by Commission action as to 
existing leases from time to time. [R. 71, 159, 489]. 
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Moreover, the installation charge may be paid in whole at 
the commencement of the TelaLease, as it is paid in the con-
ventional month-to-month payment plan, or the customer may 
elect to spread the installation charge over the period of 
Tier A. [R. 73]. 
To insure that Mountain Bell will recover its capital 
costs associated with an item of equipment, the TelaLease 
commits the business customer to pay the full amount of Tier 
A, a commitment not unlike that exacted by private unregulated 
lessors and vendors. [R. 70]. However, if the customer ter-
minates prior to completing Tier A payments, he will receive a 
credit against any Tier A payments due for the reusable value 
of the equipment. [R. 70, 146, 202-03]. A customer is also 
permitted to assign a TelaLease to another business customer. 
The objections by the Appellant to the TelaLease in this 
proceeding are identical to objections which have been raised 
by the Appellant's trade association co-members [of the North 
American Telephone Association (NATA)] in other state proceed-
ings which have considered the two-tier payment option. The 
record in this proceeding and the records of state commission 
and court decisions with respect to the same issue convinc-
ingly show that the Appellant's objections are without sub-
stantive or legal merit. 
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C. The TelaLease Payment Option ~ Not Exclusionary, 
Anticompetitive, or~ Restraint of Trade. 
The Appellant objects to what it views as the Commis-
sion 's failure to consider the objections to the TelaLease 
raised by the Utah Attorney General under the antitrust laws. 
Significantly, the Appellant neglects to detail the extent to 
which the Commission went to consider the arguments of the 
Attorney General. At the conclusion of hearings in this mat-
ter, the parties were directed to file memorandum briefs with 
the Commission. The state Attorney General filed an amicus 
curiae brief setting forth a generalized explanation of the 
antitrust laws and attempting to apply some of the general 
principles to the issues in this proceeding [R. 1385]. The 
amicus brief was signed by Mr. David Schwendiman, an Assistant 
Attorney General who had not participated in any of the prior 
Commission hearings. Notwithstanding the seeming irrelevancy 
of the objections raised in the brief, the Commission sched-
uled a full day of hearings for August 22, 1977 to consider in 
depth each of the objections raised in the amicus brief. At 
that hearing, Mr. Michael Martinez, an Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, appeared on behalf of the Attorney General. Mr. 
Martinez had neither appeared at any of the prior substantive 
hearings nor had he prepared the amicus brief submitted by the 
Attorney General. Even though the Attorney General's repre-
sentative, both on the brief and at the hearing, was unfamil-
iar with the prior evidence, the Commission granted the 
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Attorney General's office the fullest opportunity to state its 
position. Ultimately, the Commission found the antitrust ob-
jections raised by both the Appellant and the Attorney General 
to be unpersuasive, ill-founded, and based upon incorrect in-
terpretations of law. In its brief, the Appellant restates 
all of the anti trust objections on behalf of itself and the 
Attorney General. The following evidence of record and rele-
vant authorities demonstrate the correctness of the Commis-
sion's findings and conclusions. 
Appellant contends that the TelaLease payment option 
would lock the customer in to Mountain Bell and would take him 
out of the competitive terminal market for the duration of the 
selected payment period of 3, 5, 7, or 10 years. The Appel-
lant views this as anticompetitive. However, the record dem-
onstrates, and the Appellant concedes, that private, unregu-
lated suppliers and vendors of business telephone terminal 
equipment, such as the Appellant, offer equipment to the 
public on the basis of long-term leases with options to pur-
chase as well as outright sales [R. 673, 1013; Appellant's 
Brief at 21). Mr. Hogstrom of the Division of Public Utili-
ties testified that all leases and sales, by their very 
nature, tend to take the customer out of the marketplace and 
are in that theoretical sense "anticompetitive." [R. 676). 
Moreover, as between the two-tier payment option and an out-
right sale, a purchaser takes himself out of the market for 
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telephone equipment for a greater period of time than a cus-
tomer who may cancel a TelaLease at any time. 
It is significant that the Appellant cites no authorita-
tive state commission or court decision which holds that the 
concept of the two-tier TelaLease payment option is anticom-
petitive. The Appellant attempts to offer as authority the 
Colorado Commission's Decision No. 86791 entered May 6, 1975 
in Investigation & Suspension Docket No. 881. However, the 
Appellant has misrepresented the action of the Colorado Com-
mission in that Docket and in subsequent proceedings. In 
fact, the decision from which the Appellant quotes commission 
findings was revoked in its entirety by the Colorado Commis-
sion when it issued a subsequent decision in the same Docket. 
Contrary to the Appellant's assertion, the Colorado Commission 
did not affirm its prior decision from which the Appellant 
quotes. [Appellant's Brief at 22-23). Moreover, in consider-
ing the very same proposals and the very same issues which 
were before the Utah Public Service Commission in this case, 
the Colorado Commission recently authorized Mountain Bell .to 
offer a two-tier payment option for all PBX and fixed key ter-
minal telephone systems. [Investigation & Suspension Docket 
No. 1067, March 1978). In its most recent decision, the Colo-
rado Commission made no finding that the two-tier payment op-
tion was anticompetitive or illegal in any way whatsoever. 
In response to the Appellant's same objection that the 
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two-tier payment option was anticompetitive, the Connecticut 
Commission found the argument to be without any validity: 
As to the claims that the customized payment plans 
are anti-competitive this is a broad term that gen-
erally describes anything that is in opposition to 
competition. It is difficult for this Authority to 
visualize any rate structure or pricing level that 
would not be "anticompetitive" and at the same time 
not limit the availability of the product to the 
customer at a reasonable price • • • • This concept 
includes maximizing revenue contributions from ver-
tical and competitive services thus minimizing the 
revenue requirements for basic exchange service. 
Further, there is nothing this agency is aware of, 
other than their own business limitations, that pre-
cludes the competitors of the company from offering 
the same type of payment structure. 
Docket No. 760719 (Jan. 17, 1977). 
Even though this authority was disclosed to the Utah Commis-
sion in Mountain Bell's brief [R. 1205], the Appellant con-
tends that the Commission erred in approving the TelaLease. 
Mountain Bell submits that the Commission was entitled to rely 
upon the authoritative finding of a sister commission rather 
than upon the unsubstantiated non-legal opinion of the Appel-
lant's witness. In one of the more recent state commission 
proceedings considering the legality of the two-tier payment 
option, the Maryland Commission also flatly rejected an in-
tervenor's contention that the two-tier payment option was 
anticompetitive: 
According to Atlantic [the Intervenor], the two-
tier rate structure under which Dimension service is 
offered is anti-competitive since it tends to "tie-
up" the available PBX market for an extended period 
of time. As a result of C & P's [Chesapeake and 
Potomac Telephone Company's] use of a fixed term 
contract with onerous termination liability 
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provisions, Atlantic has been, in effect, precluded 
from competing for sales to those subscribers who 
have entered into a Two-Tier agreement with C & P. 
As previously mentioned, this lack of competition in 
the PBX market is allegedly detrimental to all of 
the Telephone Company's ratepayers. 
While it is true that C & P's use of a fixed 
term contract will tend to exclude Atlantic and 
other competitors from selling their products to 
customers who select the Two-Tier option, the evi-
dence on the record in this proceeding indicates 
that under such circumstances, overall competition 
may, in fact, be increased. In this regard, it 
should be noted that the Two-Tier payment option was 
developed as a competitive response to the various 
payment options which were being offered by C & P's 
interconnect competitors. These payment options 
included both long-term leases and outright sales of 
comparable PBX equipment. The record also shows 
that price and rate stability are primary consider-
ations of business customers in choosing a PBX 
system. Since the use of long-term leases and sales 
agreements provide the interconnect firms with an 
opportunity to offer lower prices and rate stabil-
ity, in order for C & P to be competitive, it was 
necessary to develop a payment plan which was simi-
lar in many respects to the long-term leases and 
sale provisions of its competitors. Consequently, I 
find that the introduction of the Two-Tier payment 
option will enhance competition with respect to a 
customer's initial selection of a PBX vehicle. To 
the extent that the Telephone Company's Two-Tier 
payment plan has the tendency to preclude subscrib-
ers from purchasing Atlantic's equipment during the 
term of the Dimension contract, Atlantic will find 
itself in the same position vis-a-vis these custom-
ers as C & P now finds itself vis-a-vis Atlantic's 
customers. 
Order, Case Nos. 6935 & 7022 (Maryland 
Public Service Commission Nov. 24, 
1978). 
In view of the fact that state utility commissions have con-
sistently rejected the unsubstantiated speculation by inter-
venors that the two-tier payment option is anticompetitive, 
the Utah Public Service Commission properly concluded that 
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11 [ t ]he Tela Lease or two-tier concept of pricing is not anti-
competitive in nature • 11 [Report & Order at 11, R. 
1142]. 
The Appellant relies upon United States '!i_· United Shoe 
Machinery Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 
U.S. 521 (1954) as authority for concluding that long-term 
equipment leasing by a company with a large market share vio-
lates the antitrust laws. Appellant's trade association co-
members have objected to the two-tier payment option in every 
proceeding on the ground that it is anticompetitive under the 
decision in United Shoe, but Appellant cites no court or 
commission that has found this authority to be persuasive or 
convincing, and Respondent is aware of none. An analysis of 
the United Shoe decision, which Appellant does not offer in 
its brief, demonstrates that United Shoe in fact sanctioned 
the continuation of long-term equipment leasing. 
Specifically, United Shoe was the manufacturer of the 
principal types of machines used in all of the major shoe 
making processes. 110 F. Supp. 297. United had contracts 
with 90 percent of all shoe factories and supplied more than 
75 percent of the demand for shoe machinery. ~· The Company 
offered a majority of this machinery on the basis of long-term 
equipment leases. In scrutinizing United's leasing practices, 
the court found two principal aspects of the leases which it 
considered anticompetitive. First, United offered the most 
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complicated and most remunerative machines on a lease basis 
only. ~· at 314. Second, when accepting returns of machines 
before the lease period had run, United Shoe offered less fa-
vorable terms to a lessee who replaced United's machine with a 
machine of outside manufacture than to a lessee having some 
other reason for returning a United machine. Id. at 321. 
"[W]hen a lessee desires to replace a United machine, United 
gave him more favorable terms if the replacement is by another 
United machine than if it is by a competitive machine." Id. at 
340. In its final decree, the court ordered United Shoe to 
continue leasing machinery with two modifications: The court 
ordered the company to make provision for a uniform termina-
tion penalty and to offer an optional payment plan in addition 
to long-term leasing. 
It is apparent that Mountain Bell's two-tier TelaLease 
payment option conforms to the court's decree in United Shoe. 
Mountain Bell offers the TelaLease payment option as an alter-
native payment option to the conventional month-to-month plan. 
Furthermore, Mountain Bell offers a uniform reuse credit con-
sistent with a schedule prepared by the company's engineering 
department and applied uniformly to all business customers re-
gardless of their reason for terminating the lease [R. 70, 
146, 202-03). Contrary to the Appellant's assertion, United 
Shoe is convincing authority that Mountain Bell's two-tier 
TelaLease payment option does not offend the antitrust laws. 
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Moreover, the Division of Public Utilities in this pro-
ceeding independently concluded that "[f]rom an economic 
standpoint, the Division believes the evidence does not show 
that the TelaLease, by itself, is either anticompetitive or 
discriminatory as asserted by Intervenors." [R. 1254]. 
The decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 
894 (10th Cir. 1975) also demonstrates that the two-tier 
payment option is not 
the antitrust laws. 
anticompetitive 
Competitors of 
or exclusionary under 
IBM offered long-term 
leases of peripheral computer and data products, which can be 
attached to central processing units in much the same sense as 
terminal telephone equipment, a peripheral product, is at-
tached to the central telephone network. The court observed 
that it was undoubtedly "the wide use of the IBM central pro-
cessing unit that caused Telex and others to market peripheral 
devices which were plug compatible with the IBM unit and which 
could replace IBM peripheral devices which had been made for 
the IBM central system." ..!.£· at 899. Even though IBM's com-
petitors offered plug compatible peripheral computer and data 
products on the basis of long-term leases, Telex contended 
that Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act [15 u.s.c. §§ 1 & 2) 
and Section 2 of the Clayton Act [15 u.s.c. § 13] should be 
construed to bar IBM from offering comparable long-term lease 
payment plans for similar products because of IBM's dominant 
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market position. Id. at 898. The Tenth Circuit expressly re-
jected this contention. The court concluded that IBM's long-
term equipment leases were comparable to those offered by 
other competitors and that they were "ordinary marketing 
methods available to all in the market." _!i. at 926. To pro-
hibit IBM from competitive equipment leasing in the market-
place would be "to protect the others in the market from 
ordinary competition •••• " Id. at 927. 
The Connecticut Commission reached the same conclusion 
with respect to the two-tier payment option. Decision, Docket 
No. 760719 (Jan. 17, 1977). Similarly, the District of 
Columbia Commission concluded that the two-tier payment plan 
is a "legitimate competitive response Rejection of 
two-tier pricing would undercut the Company's ability to com-
pete In competitive markets, it is common practice to 
offer payment plans which provide for a fixed payment over a 
fixed period. • The Company should not be prevented from 
using marketing concepts which are in common usage and, in 
fact, are being used by its competitors." Decision No. 5870, 
Docket No. TT76-18 (D.C. PSC Mar. 30, 1977), ~. Decision 
No. 5874 (Apr. 29, 1977). The Georgia Commission also found 
that the two-tier payment option "is not illegal, discrimina-
tory, or anticompetitive." Order, Case No. 2895-U (Jan. 31, 
1977). 
In spite of the fact that the Appellant can marshal no 
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commission or judicial authority to support its contention 
that the two-tier payment option is anticompetitive, the Ap-
pellant attempts to fabricate a theory that Mountain Bell 
should be precluded from offering the payment option because 
of the Company's size and market share. However, the uncon-
troverted evidence of record and supporting legal authority 
demonstrate that the Appellant's theory is without merit and 
the Public Service Commission properly refused to give it any 
credence. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that 
market dominance is not a barrier under the antitrust laws to 
long-term equipment leasing such as the two-tier payment op-
tion. Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 
510 F.2d 894, 900 n.2 (10th Cir. 1975). Moreover, unlike the 
facts in the Telex decision, the uncontroverted evidence in 
this proceeding demonstrates that Mountain Bell's PBX and key 
system market shares will in fact decline substantially under 
the TelaLease payment option. Mountain Bell currently posses-
ses 89 percent of the Utah PBX market. [R. 471]. Under the 
tariff modifications and the two-tier payment option approved 
in this case, the PBX market share will decline to 79. 1 per-
cent within five years. [R. 513-14]. Mountain Bell currently 
possesses 98 percent of the Utah key system market. Under the 
tariff modifications and the two-tier payment option approved 
in this case, the key system market share will decline to 83.8 
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percent within five years. [R. 513). In view of this unre-
butted evidence and the controlling antitrust case law, the 
Appellant's contention that the "TelaLease payment plan • 
is exclusionary, anticompetitive, and was designed and in-
tended to restrain trade" [Appellant's Brief at 23) cannot be 
supported by any evidence or legal theory. The evidence shows 
the competitive and market impact of the two-tier payment op-
tion on Mountain Bell's share of the PBX and key system mar-
kets. The uncontroverted evidence supports the Commission's 
findings that "[t]he TelaLease or two-tier concept of pricing 
is not anticompetitive in nature and will not artificially 
enable Mountain Bell to maintain its market position. 
The two-tier concept of pricing is a permissible offering in 
this jurisdiction and is a reasonable response by Mountain 
Bell to the competitive market in which it must offer its 
terminal equipment." [Report and Order at 11-12, R. 1142) 
D. The Two-Tier TelaLease Payment Option Is Not 
iSTScriminatory or Preferential. 
One of the Appellant's contrived objections to the 
TelaLease payment option is that it unfairly discriminates 
against the conventional month-to-month customer who receives 
no assurance that a portion of his rates will not change in 
the future. The distinction between the two payment options, 
however, rests upon sound cost justification which state com-
missions and courts have found convincing. In the course of 
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reviewing the two-tier payment option, the New York Supreme 
Court (Appellate Division) flatly rejected the Appellant's as-
sertion that two-tier pricing discriminates against other 
telephone subscribers: 
The novelty of the approved schedules does not rob 
them of their inherent cost justification which, as 
noted, stems from an evaluation of the identifiable 
capital and operating expenses of particular types 
of equipment. Traditional rate-making views a 
broader range of equipment investment and rests on 
an equally valid, though less specific, basis. 
Thus, the differentiation in charges under these two 
systems may be tolerated for neither exacts an un-
just or unreasonable payment from the customer. 
Conventional subscribers stop paying for their ser-
vice whenever they choose to discontinue it, whereas 
two-tier customers are obliged to complete the 
stream of "A" rate payments should they decide to 
terminate service before their six or seven-year en-
listment expires. Accordingly, neither group has 
taken service under the same or substantially the 
same circumstances or conditions • and neither 
has been unduly prejudiced or disadvantaged in any 
respect • • • • 
In re Tele/Resources, Inc., 58 App.Div.2d 406, 
396N.Y.S.2d 906, 909 (1977). 
Moreover, both the District of Columbia Commission and the 
Rhode Island Commission have explicitly rejected the Appel-
lant's assertion that the two-tier payment option unfairly 
discriminates against the month-to-month customer: 
To begin, the Company has a logical basis for es-
tablishing a price difference between two-tier rates 
and conventional month-to-month rates. 
The two payment plans will appeal to entirely 
different customers. Under the conventional month-
to-month payment plan, the customer pays a single 
charge designed to recover both non-recurring cap-
ital costs and on-going operating expenses. This 
charge continues as long as the customer retains the 
equipment. The month-to-month customer is free to 
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discontinue service anytime, without paying a pen-
alty. 
* * * 
For customers who anticipate continuing their Di-
mension service at the same location for an extended 
period, the two-tier payment plan is less expensive 
than month-to-month service and will be selected. A 
customer is likely to choose month-to-month service 
only if that customer expects to discontinue Dimen-
sion service or to shift locations. As a result, 
the Dimension equipment used by the more transient 
month-to-month customer will have a relatively 
shorter location life and service life. The ensuing 
cost differences alone would justify a differential 
between two-tier rates and month-to-month rates. 
In addition we note 
would not be imposed 
As the Rhode Island 
ruled: 
that any rate differentials 
upon customers involuntarily. 
Public Utilities Commission 
"The concept, as offered in this jurisdiction, 
would be optional to the customers. As the 
customer of the service, it is his choice 
whether he wishes to avail himself of this 
two-tier plan or the more traditional monthly 
payment plan. 
• • • 
[A]ll customers would have the option to choose 
either two-tier pricing or the conventional 
monthly payment. A customer who chooses the 
two-tier payment plan does so under circum-
stances which are appreciably different than 
those choosing the traditional monthly payment. 
Therefore, we find no basis for intervenors' 
claim of discrimination between the two cate-
gories of customers." [New England Tel. ! Co., 
16 PUR4th 379, 381-382--"TRhode Island Public 
Utilities Commission 1976).] 
This Commission is in total agreement with these 
views. 
Order No. 5870 at 3-5 (District of Columbia 
Public Service Commission.) 
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Accord, Report and Order at 9, Case No. 18565 (Missouri Public 
Service Commission, Dec. 20, 1978); Order at 4, Docket No. 
105712-U (Kansas Corporation Commission, Nov. 20, 1978). 
Appellant's second contrived objection to the two-tier 
payment option, which is identical to objections made by its 
association co-members in other state proceedings, is that 
vintage tariffs are inherently discriminatory as between 
TelaLease customers subscribing to substantially the same 
service. The concept of vintage tariffs, i.e. , modification 
of Tier "A" and the continuing fixed portion of Tier "B" af-
fecting future TelaLease customers to reflect subsequent in-
creased capital costs, reflects economic reality. In no case 
has a state commission or court disapproved of this concept or 
requirement for vintage tariffs. The findings of the District 
of Columbia Commission with respect to this allegation of 
discrimination are representative of other state commission 
findings: 
Periodically, as costs increase, the Company will 
file higher Tier A rates for new customers. Con-
sequently, although two customers may select the 
same contract term, one customer will enjoy a lower 
rate if its equipment was installed under an earlier 
"vintage" tariff. 
Plainly, the resulting rate differentials are cost 
based. The Tier A rate is directly related to Di-
mension PBX' s capital costs. Those costs are de-
termined when the equipment is installed. In our 
present economy, the investment required to provide 
Dimension service will rise over the years. Each 
generation of Dimension customers will thus assume 
different capital costs. Since they recognize this 
cost variance, "vintage" tariffs are not only 
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justified, they are required. 
Order No. 5870 at 6-7, Docket No. TT76-18 (Mar. 
30, 1977), aff'd, Order No. 5874 (Apr. 29, 
1977). --
Accord, Order at p. 4, Docket No. 105712-U (Kansas Corp. Com-
mission, Nov. 20, 1978); Report & Order at p. 9, Case No. 
18565 (Missouri Public Service Commission, Dec. 20, 1978). 
The relevant portions of the final decisions by the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Rhode Island commissions, quoted above, 
were set forth in Mountain Bell's Post-Hearing Brief for the 
Commission's review. These authorities in the record lend 
convincing support to the Utah Commission's finding that the 
"TelaLease concept is not discriminatory in nature either to 
other PBX customers, to other categories of telephone cus-
tome rs or as between two-tier customers. II [Report and Order 
at 11 I R. 1142). Other courts and state commissions, cited 
above, have subsequently reached the same legal conclusion to 
sustain that finding. 
E. Mountain Bell's Use of the Equated Cost of Moner 
Methodology Accurately-Reflects the ActUal Cost 2-_ 
Financing an Asset Under the Two-Tier Payment 
Option. 
For purposes of capitalizing a unit of terminal telephone 
equipment on the company's books under a two-tier payment op-
tion, Mountain Bell ensures that each such item of equipment 
covers the costs which it causes. When an asset is purchased 
by Mountain Bell, it becomes capitalized on the company's 
books and it is depreciated over its useful life. However, 
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the investor must be paid a return on the undepreciated por-
tion of his investment. In the early years of the asset's 
useful life, the undepreciated balance is high and the re-
quired return is, therefore, correspondingly high. As the 
asset is depreciated, however, the undepreciated balance 
diminishes and the return requirement for the undepreciated 
balance becomes less and less in each succeeding year. The 
return requirement is not uniform; it declines dramatically 
over the useful life of the asset. This accounting concept is 
the basis of what has been called the Equated Cost of Money 
Methodology used by Mountain Bell for purposes of capitalizing 
those i terns of telephone equipment which may be offered under 
the two-tier payment option. This methodology is predicated 
on the fact that the return is computed on each individual 
asset and that the required return in each year is the return 
on the undepreciated balance of the asset in that year. 
The Appellant contends that a different methodolo~ 
should be employed for capitalizing an asset under the two· 
tier payment option. The Appellant advocates the use of what 
has been called the Forecasted Growth Reserve or Depreciatior. 
Reserve. This accounting methodology ignores the capi taliza· 
tion of individual assets and requires that all similar asse~ 
be capitalized alike as a group. It assumes that the requirec 
return must be the same for all assets in a class and that t~ 1 
return requirement will not decline in spite of the fact that 1 
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the undepreciated balance declines dramatically. So long as 
the return requirement remains consistently high, the prices 
which must be charged to the customer remain consistently high 
and the customer is required to pay a price higher than re-
quired under the two-tier payment option. 
The fundamental difference between the two accounting 
methods is that the Equated Cost of Money methodology repre-
sents the actual cost of financing an asset whereas the 
Forecasted Growth Reserve methodology represents a presumptive 
theoretical model for determining the cost of financing a 
group of assets. On the basis of its theoretical model, the 
Appellant concludes that prices for equipment under the two-
tier payment option will be insufficient to cover costs, and 
subsidization from residential monopoly services will be nee-
' essary. 
The evidence of record in this proceeding factually in-
validates the Appellant's theoretical model and conclusion. 
Mr. Glenn Brown, a witness for Mountain Bell, not only fully 
explained the Equated Cost of Money methodology for the Com-
mission, but he also contrasted it with the Appellant's sug-
gested model to illustrate the unreality of the presumptions 
in the Forecasted Growth Reserve methodology. [R. 907-10; 
Applicant's Exhibits 20 & 30). In response to the Appellant's 
reckless contention that use of the Equated Cost of Money 
methodology would lead to corporate insolvency [Appellant's 
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Brief at 36], Mr. Brown testified that bank lending institu-
tions employ exactly the same Equated Cost of Money method-
ology. [R. 909]. 
Moreover, many state commissions have rejected the Appel-
lant 's theoretical model and have approved the telephone com-
pany's use of the Equated Cost of Money methodology. In its 
final decision, entered contemporaneously with the Utah Com-
mission's final Report and Order in this matter, the Illinois 
Commerce Commission concluded: 
Respondent's [Illinois Bell's] • rates are cost 
justified and its utilization of the Equated Cost of 
Money Methodology enables Respondent to recover its 
exact capital cost rather than an inflated amount 
during the later years of its contract periods which 
would result from the utilization of the Account 
Average [Fore casted Growth Reserve] methodology 
• Order at p. 7, Case No. 59556 (Dec. 21, 1977). 
Even more recently, the Maryland Public Service Commission 
also rejected the Appellant's challenge: 
Another significant difference between the cost 
studies relates to the determination of the 
net investment to be recovered through Tier A rates. 
In this regard, [the Appellant] utilized a theoreti-
cal depreciation reserve for • • • equipment •••• 
In general, it is proper under most circumstances to 
use a depreciation reserve factor which is based 
upon the experience of an entire account; it is 
usually impractical to develop specific average net 
investment for individual customers. However, under 
the Two-Tier pricing, the recovery of investment for 
each customer is guaranteed, and, accordingly, the 
specific average net investment for individual 
customers can be readily determined. Since the 
specific average net investment [Equated Cost of 
Money methodology] more accurately reflects the net 
investment which must be recovered through [two-
tier] rates, it would be unreasonable to use a 
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depreciation reserve factor [Forecasted Growth 
Reserve methodology] which is based on an entire 
account when the specific average net investment can 
be derived. Case No. 6936, Order at pp. 18-19 (Oct. 
25, 1978), aff'd, Order No. 63442 (Nov. 24, 1978). 
It is apparent, therefore, that there is substantial evidence 
of record and legal authority to support the Utah Commission's 
approval of the two-tier TelaLease payment option as well as 
the Commission's approval of the two-tier prices proposed. 
[Report and Order at 11, Finding and Conclusion 116 & 1110, R. 
114 2]. 
VI. 
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY APPROVED MOUNTAIN 
BELL'S TARIFFS FOR BUSINESS TERMINAL 
TELEPHONE EQUIPMENT WHICH COVER NOT ONLY 
ALL INCREMENTAL COSTS BUT ALL FULLY 
DISTRIBUTED COSTS AS WELL 
The second major issue for which the Appellant seeks 
judicial review relates to the propriety of the cost studies 
underlying the tariffs for business telephone services which 
the Commission approved. Again, substantial competent evi-
dence of record supports the Commission's findings and con-
clusions which should, therefore, not be disturbed upon judi-
cial review. Utah Light ! Traction Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683 (1941); Salt Lake City 
!:_Utah Light! Traction Co., 52 Utah 210, 173 P. 556 (1918). 
The Respondent employed generally-recognized and judi-
cially-approved studies to calculate the incremental or direct 
costs of offering each of the items of business telephone 
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equipment. The Commission expressly recognized and approved 
the use of incremental costs for purposes of determining rates 
for competitive telephone equipment more than five years ago. 
[Report and Order, Investigation & Suspension Docket No. 155 
(Jan. 7, 1974)]. The Respondent also utilized a methodology 
known as a long-run incremental analysis (LRIA) to identify 
market prices which not only cover and exceed costs but also 
generate a substantial contribution which can be applied to 
common overhead expenses of monopoly residential telephone 
services. [R. 62, 63-67; Applicant's Exhibits 4 & 21). 
The Appellant argued that costs should be calculated 
based upon a so-called fully distributed cost methodology. In 
response to a request by the Division of Public Utilities, the 
Respondent prepared and tendered fully distributed cost 
studies to demonstrate that the proposed business telephone 
service rates exceeded those costs as well by a substantial 
margin. [Applicant's Exhibit 20; R. 883-84). The Commission 
rejected the Appellant's so-called fully distributed cost 
study and concluded that the Respondent's rates were proper 
and compensatory and that they exceeded both incremental and 
fully distributed costs. Notwithstanding the overwhelming 
evidence of record in support of the Commission's decision 
approving the proposed rates, the Appellant continues to com· 
plain. The price methodology issue is rendered moot by the 
Commission's conclusion that both incremental and fully 
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distributed costs are covered by the approved rates, and this 
conclusion, supported by substantial evidence, should not be 
disturbed upon review. 
A. A Long Run Incremental Analysis is an Appropriate 
PriC"Ing Model Justifying the Commission's Approval 
of the Proposed Tariffs. 
The long run incremental analysis (LRIA) employed by Re-
spondent is, simply stated, a pricing methodology that selects 
a price for a competitive product or service so as to cover 
the incremental costs of offering the product or service, 
while simultaneously optimizing the contribution which can be 
applied to the cost of offering other products or services. 
In the proceeding before the Commission, Mountain Bell pre-
sented a detailed study based upon a long run incremental 
analysis in support of its proposed tariffs for business 
telephone equipment. [R. 63-67; Applicant's Exhibits 4 & 21]. 
The following factors involved in LRIA were identified: 
1. Demand Elasticity. 
One of the elements considered by the long run incre-
mental analysis was the impact of price changes on customer 
demand. The price of a product is directly related to the 
demand therefor. [R. 63]. As the price increases, customer 
demand decreases; conversely, as the price decreases, customer 
demand increases. [R. 64]. Obviously, if demand elasticity 
were the only element of LRIA, Mountain Bell would have pro-
posed the lowest price, so as to maximize customer demand and 
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to achieve the largest market share. However, the record dem-
onstrates that Mountain Bell did not select the lowest price 
[R. 889), because it was not Mountain Bell's objective to 
maximize customer demand. 
2. Competitor's Prices. 
Another element of LRIA was the consideration of competi-
tors' prices for comparable or competitive products and ser-
vices. As Mountain Bell's prices increase above those of its 
competition, Mountain Bell's customer demand decreases and the 
customer demand of the competitors increases. [Tr. 64). 
Again, if this were the only factor to be considered in LRIA 
and if Mountain Bell's objective were to maximize its service 
offerings over those of its competitors, Mountain Bell would 
have proposed tariffs for a price somewhat lower than that of 
the competition. Mountain Bell, however, did not select a 
price less than competitors' prices, because maximum customer 
demand was not a goal of the Company. 
3. Cross-Elasticity. 
A third element of LRIA was a consideration of product 
alternatives offered by Mountain Bell and its competitors and 
the prices therefor. Clearly, the cross-elasticity of demand 
indicates that "the price of one product can influence the 
quantity sold of another product." [R. 64-65). This cross· 
elasticity factor affects the price and customer demand for 
functionally interchangeable items of telephone equipment. 
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4. Payment Plans. 
The cost of providing business telephone service is a 
direct function of the anticipated location life and period of 
use by the customer [Applicant's Exhibit 3], and in turn, the 
location life of business terminal telephone equipment is a 
direct function of the payment options offered by each of the 
competitors in the marketplace. LRIA examines this factor 
because varied payment plans, such as the conventional month-
to-month option, competitors' leases, and competitors' out-
right sales, influence the customer demand, price and costs of 
business telephone services. [R. 65-66]. 
5. Incrementalism. 
The selection of a proper price under LRIA requires the 
prospective analysis of the incremental effects of any pricing 
decision. [R. 66]. A projection of such incremental effects 
involves an analysis of the changes occurring in the market as 
a result of a pricing decision. 
6. Contribution. 
The most critical factor in the long run incremental 
analysis employed by Mountain Bell was consideration of the 
contribution which is generated at various price levels as 
customer demand changes. Contribution is defined as the dif-
ference between the revenues that a product or service will 
bring into the firm and the costs resulting from the introduc-
tion of that product or service. [R. 65]. Contribution is 
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the mathematical difference between incremental revenues and 
incremental costs. [R. 66-67]. LRIA, as utilized by Mountain 
Bell, indicates the price level at which contribution is opti-
mized so that such contribution can be applied to the cost of 
providing monopoly services. 
It should be emphasized that LRIA generally, and specifi-
cally the LRIA prese.nted by Mountain Bell to the Commission, 
does not compel the conclusion that the contribution is great-
est when prices are set at the highest level nor that contri-
bution is least when prices are set at the lowest level. [Ap-
plicant's Exhibit 21]. Contribution is increased at any price 
level which "raises revenues more than it raises costs" or at 
any price level which "decreases revenues less than it 
decreases costs". [R. 66-67]. The LRIA methodology, by 
examining a number of alternative price levels, determines the 
price which yields the optimum contribution. A long run in-
cremental analysis is the only pricing methodology capable of 
achieving the optimization of contribution. [R. 823, 1247-
48]. It is also consistent with the Commission's declaration 
in 1974 that prices for competitive telephone services are 
proper when they cover all relevant costs and make a contri· 
bution to the general overhead expenses for the benefit of 
customers of monopoly residential service. [Report & Order, 
Investigation & Suspension Docket No. 155 (Jan. 7, 1974)]. 
After Mountain Bell's LRIA indicated the proper prices, 
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the company then calculated the incremental costs of the prod-
ucts and services involved. A Unit Incremental Cost Study 
(UNIC), which calculates and evaluates the incremental costs, 
is simply a methodology against which to compare the price 
level dictated by the LRIA model. [R. 885-86). LRIA indi-
cates the price generating the 
verifies that the selected price 
cremental costs. 
optimum contribution; UNIC 
covers all relevant or in-
Incremental cost is defined as "the additional cost to 
the firm of supplying a particular service. It excludes costs 
directly attributable to the production of other services and 
certain unattributable costs which are incurred in common for 
all services supplied by the firm and do not vary with the 
level of output." Baumol & Walton, "Full Costing, Competition 
and Regulatory Practice," 82 YALE L.J. 639 (1973). See also, 
American Commercial Lines v. Louisville & Nashville ~ Co., 
392 U.S. 571, 577 n.7 (1968); Pacific Engineering & Production 
Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 n.3 (10th Cir. 1977). 
The result of Mountain Bell's comparison between its LRIA, 
which dictates price, and its UNIC analysis, which aggregates 
relevant cos ts below which any price is unacceptable, reveals 
a wide-ranging positive variance between cost and price. In-
cremental costs act as a floor below which Mountain Bell can-
not and does not price. [R. 58-59). The record further demon-
strates that, in each case, Mountain Bell's proposed tariffs 
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exceed the incremental costs 
cost to 242 percent above cost. 
from between 18 percent above 
[R. 479-480). For each item 
of terminal equipment, Mountain Bell's price covers its in-
cremental cost by a substantial margin. [R. 99, 120-121). 
Each of the approximately 250 UNIC studies presented by 
Mountain Bell with respect to each i tern of business telephone 
terminal equipment took into consideration the following 
factors: 
1. Initial Cost. 
For each equipment unit, Mountain Bell's UNIC studies ac-
counted for the cost of obtaining and installing that equip-
ment item, including, as applicable, ( 1) the material price, 
(2) labor expense, (3) the supply or transportation expense of 
shipment to the customer's location, (4) applicable sales 
taxes, ( 5) telephone company engineering expense, ( 6) supply 
expense for materials, (7) applicable sales taxes thereon, and 
(8) sales expense. [R. 124, 126). 
2. Total Cost of Removal. 
Because Mountain Bell retains ownership of each i tern of 
business terminal telephone equipment, Mountain Bell must ul-
timately incur an expense in connection with the removal of 
that equipment from the customer's premises. [R. 127]. That 
expense is identified and included in Mountain Bell's UNIC 
analysis. 
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3. Annual Recurring Expenses. 
The annual recurring expenses incurred in connection with 
a customer's use of terminal telephone equipment have likewise 
been identified and accounted for in the UNIC studies. Spe-
cifically, these include ( 1) labor expense for maintenance, 
(2) material expense for maintenance, (3) direct administra-
tion comprised of overhead directly attributable to that 
equipment i tern as well as the sales cost incurred in connec-
tion with obtaining each customer's subscription for that 
service, ( 4) ad valorem taxes on each item, and ( 5) gross 
receipts tax on each item. [R. 128). 
The relationship between Mountain Bell's LRIA analysis 
and UNIC studies is rather simple: The long run incremental 
analysis (LRIA) examines the competitive marketplace for the 
purpose of indicating the proper price for optimum contribu-
tion; the unit incremental cost study (UNIC), for each item of 
equipment, examines the incremental costs to verify that the 
price selected by LRIA covers each equipment item's incremen-
tal costs. [R. 889). This LRIA-UNIC methodology is a valid 
economic approach by which to evaluate and test alternative 
pricing decisions. [R. 836]. In all cases in this proceed-
ing, the UNIC studies verified that the proposed tariffs se-
lected by the LRIA analysis for all competitive business tele-
phone equipment, including Dimension 400 PBX and ComKey 2152, 
were substantially above the incremental costs. [R. 479-480]. 
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In its analysis, the Commission specifically recited this 
evidence [Report and Order at 7, R. 1140] upon which it based 
its finding that the Respondent's rates "are priced at a level 
which will recover for Mountain Bell all of its costs asso-
ciated with the provision of said products and services" and 
that the tariffs approved were "fully compensatory, just, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory." [Report and Order at 11-
12, R. 1142] 
B. A Long Run Incremental Analysis is a Pricing Model 
SuperT°or-rD the Fully Distributed Cost MethodOIOgy 
Proposed by Appelranf:- --
The Appellant imagines three principal faults in the 
manner in which the Respondent selected prices for competitive 
business telephone services and the manner in which incremen-
tal or direct costs were calculated. The Appellant contends, 
erroneously, that Mountain Bell failed to consider the costs 
of premature retirement of telephone equipment taken out of 
service. The Appellant argues, wrongly, that equipment costs 
should be computed using the Appellant's so-called fully dis-
tributed cost methodology. Finally, the Appellant concludes, 
again erroneously, that because Mountain Bell's rates were not 
calculated using the Appellant's fully distributed cost model, 
they will not recover all costs associated with each service 
and that monopoly residential ratepayers will be called upon 
to subsidize the costs of providing competitive business tele-
phone services. Each of these contentions was examined in 
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detail during the Commission hearings. Substantial evidence 
and testimony were presented by Mountain Bell upon which the 
Commission relied to reject the Appellant's arguments. Not 
surprisingly, a vast number of state regulatory commissions 
have reached the same conclusion as the Utah Public Service 
Commission. 
1. Premature Retirement Costs were Identified and Fully 
Covered by the Approved Rates for Competitive Busi-
ness Telephone Services. --- -- ---
Throughout these proceedings, the Appellant has contended 
that Mountain Bell's LRIA-UNIC model fails to take into consid-
eration premature retirement costs. [Appellant's Brief at 40; 
R. 620, 1364; Intervenor's Exhibit 8 at 9-12]. The record 
fully demonstrates, however, that this cost has been accounted 
for and covered in Mountain Bell's long run incremental anal-
ysis. 
Premature retirement has been defined as the removal of 
equipment from service after which it no longer produces in-
come but before the time it is fully depreciated. [Inter-
venor's Exhibit 8 at 10-11]. Premature retirement of equip-
ment can occur in two ways: (1) it will inevitably occur, 
even in the absence of competition, when a new technology dis-
places an older technology, regardless of whether the new 
technology is produced by Mountain Bell or its competitors, 
and (2) when a newer, better, or less expensive product of a 
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competitor displaces a Mountain Bell product in the market-
place. 
Throughout these proceedings, the Appellant has contended 
that Mountain Bell's cost studies do not reflect premature re-
tirement costs on a unit basis. [Intervenor's Exhibit 8 at 
12]. The Appellant's expert witness, Dr. Wilson, contended 
that premature retirement costs should be included on a unit 
basis in a cost study, even though Dr. Wilson conceded that he 
totally failed to quantify such costs on a unit basis in his 
cost study presented to the Commission. [R. 1366]. In fact, 
the evidence of record demonstrated that premature retirement 
is a variable market cost dependent upon price and customer 
demand and that it cannot be quantified on a unit basis as can 
other expenses such as maintenance and installation costs. 
The Appellant admitted that the demand for telephone equipment 
is a function of the price charged and that the costs of tele-
phone service are, in turn, determined by customer demand. 
[R. 573-74]. Therefore, the Appellant implicitly conceded 
that premature retirement is a variable market cost and that 
price is a factor that affects this cost. Moreover, the Ap· 
pellant affirmatively conceded below that Mountain Bell "did 
look at the substitution of equipment in conjunction with its 
LRIA study." [R. 1366]. 
Premature retirement has been properly considered and ac· 
counted for in Mountain Bell's LRIA analysis because premature 
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retirement has a direct impact on contribution, a market fac-
tor specifically weighed in Mountain Bell's incremental anal-
ysis. Premature retirement causes contribution to decline, 
because the displaced product's revenues are lost even though 
not all of its costs are avoidable. Because one of Mountain 
Bell's pricing objectives under LRIA analysis is to optimize 
contribution, Mountain Bell has selected proposed tariffs 
which provide the greatest amount of contribution and which, 
therefore, eliminate the impact of premature retirement on 
overall contribution to basic monopoly telephone services. 
[R. 888-89; Applicant's Exhibit 21]. The Appellant's conten-
tion that premature retirement costs were not included in 
Mountain Bell's rate analysis is, therefore, negated by the 
evidence of record and the testimony of the Appellant's own 
expert witness. 
2. The Appellant's Fully Distributed Cost Model Ignores 
the Relevant Costs and Would Result in the Preferen-
tial Protect~or---Prrvate VendorS- Of"" Telephone 
EQUTpment Over Whoiilthe Commission Does-Wot Exercise 
Regulatory Al.ithorITy .--
In spite of the fact that prices charged by private les-
sors and vendors of telephone equipment are not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, Telerent Leas-
ing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974), aff'd, 537 F.2d 787 (4th 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027, the Appellant and its 
trade association co-members take the position that the state 
commissions should fix the operating telephone companies' rates 
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for competitive telephone equipment at artificial levels so 
high that the Appellant need never concern itself with meeting 
competition from the local telephone utility. This economic 
concept is referred to as the creation of an "umbrella" price 
under which the Appellant and its trade association co-members 
receive competitive protection from the Commission. 
Obviously, the Appellant cannot accomplish its purpose 
only by recommending that the Commission reject Mountain 
Bell's rates and establish, in lieu thereof, artificially 
higher protectionist rates. Therefore, the Appellant has de-
vised a strategy to attack Mountain Bell's incremental cost 
studies and long run incremental analysis. Not surprisingly, 
the Appellant comes to the conclusion that Mountain Bell's ap-
proved rates do not cover all costs which the Appellant iden-
tifies. In lieu of incremental costs, which the Utah Commis-
sion earlier approved, the Appellant contends that the Commis-
sion should adopt a so-called fully distributed cost study 
which would cause Mountain Bell to charge higher prices. Al-
though the strategy may be imaginative, it finds no evidence 
or basis in the record to commend it. 
Mountain Bell contends, and the Utah Commission agreed in 
1974, that a fully distributed cost analysis is an improper 
methodology upon which to select prices in the competitive 
marketplace. A fully distributed cost study can and does lead 
to an improper price to the detriment of both the competitive 
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service user and the monopoly service user. Furthermore, his-
tory documents the fact that one competitor, to protect its 
own unique market position, typically urges a regulatory 
agency to employ a fully distributed cost approach in setting 
the rates of another competitor. 1 
Fully distributed costs have been advocated most vigor-
ously by competitors of regulated utilities who stand to bene-
fit from higher utility rates. Buslines, railroads, express 
companies, and airlines have argued before the CAB for a fully 
distributed cost standard which would increase the rates of 
competing airlines. Coal interests, unregulated gas pro-
ducers, and pipelines have urged the FPC to employ a fully 
distributed cost standard in setting the rates for competing 
pipelines. Motor carriers and water carriers faced with the 
prospect of reduced rail rates have urged the ICC to employ 
such a standard. Finally, the railroads, normally opposed to 
fully distributed cost, have argued that the standard should 
be employed for setting rates for truckers. The regulatory 
case law evidence is clear: Competitors who face increased 
price competition from a regulated entity have been the prime 
advocates of fully distributed cost methods of price regula-
tion. The following are but a few examples of those in-
stances: 
Buslines: Domestic Passenger-Fare Investigation, Phase 
5--Discount Fares, C.A.B. Order No. 72-12-18 at 17 (Dec. 5, 
1972); Standby Youth Fares--"Young Adult" Fares, [1964-1971 
Transfer Binder] CCH Av. L. Rep. 11 21,923 at 14,878 (CAB 
1970); Family Fare Tariff [1964-1971) CCH Av. L. Rep.1J 21,782 
at 14, 555 (CAB 1968); Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. 
C.A.B., 383 F.2d 466, 472 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 
U:S.-920 ( 1968). --
Railroads: Pittsburgh-Philadelphia 
Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 508, 515-16, 521 
Mail Rate Case, 34 C.A.B. 143, 165 (1961). 
No-Reservation Fare 
( 1961); Nonpriori ty 
Express Companies: Railway Express Agency v. C.A.B., 243 
F.2d 422, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
Airlines: Group Inclusive Tour Basing Fares to Hawaii, 
[1964-1971 Transfer BinderJ CCH Av. L. Rep. 1 21,937 at 
14,913-15 (CAB 1970). 
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The principal difference between a unit incremental cost 
study and a fully distributed cost study involves the alloca-
ti on of common overhead expenses of the company. Fully dis-
tributed cost includes not only the additional cost to the 
firm of supplying a particular service (the incremental cost), 
but it also includes some proportion of the unattributable 
costs which are called overhead costs or fixed costs or common 
costs or remaining costs. Baumol & Walton, "Full Costing, 
Competition and Regulatory Practice," 82 YALE L. J. 639 n. 1 
(1973). 
Common overhead exists whether or not a proposed new 
telephone service, such as Dimension, is offered. Office 
facilities, executive salaries, heating, lighting, air 
conditioning, and similar expenses not uniquely caused by the 
introduction of a new telephone service are, therefore, not 
1 cont. 
Unregulated Gas Producers: Pacific Gas Transmission Co., 
40 F.P.C. 1147 (1968), reh. denied, 40 F.P.C. 1504, 1506 
(1968), aff'd sub nom.,california Gas Producers Ass'n v. 
F.P.C., 4'21F.2d---zf22"19lh Cir. 1970). 
Competing Pipelines: Great Lakes Transmission Co., 37 
F.P.C. 1070, 1090 (1967); Transwestern Pipeline Co., 34 F.P.C. 
659, 679, 681 (1965). 
Motor Carriers: Paint and Related Articles in Official 
Territory, 308 I.C.C. 439, 444 (1959); Demountable Motortruck 
Bodies Loaded or Empty, 305 I.C.C. 161, 168 (Div. 2 1958). 
Water Carriers: Rules to Govern the Assembling and Pre-
senting of Cost Evidence, 337 I.C.C. 298, 357 (1970); Plastics 
from Texas to the East, 314 I.C.C. 347, 352 (Div. 2 1961). 
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properly included in a unit incremental cost study (UNIC). 
Conversely, a fully distributed cost study requires that these 
common overhead expenses be allocated in some manner to each 
new service offering. However, the method for allocating 
these expenses equitably has never been resolved 2 and the 
record indicates the wide-ranging disparity among fully dis-
tributed cost studies because of this variance. [R. 65, 655]. 
Each fully distributed cost study is different from all other 
fully distributed cost studies since no agreement can be 
reached with respect to the manner of allocation; indeed, the 
Staff in this proceeding conceded that many alternatives could 
2 
The fact that common cost allocations involving a multi-
service enterprise are inherently arbitrary has often been 
recognized by the courts and regulatory agencies. Mr. Justice 
Brandeis many years ago observed that no satisfactory method 
for common cost allocations "has yet been devised" and he 
noted that "it may be long before a formula is devised which 
can be accepted as satisfactory." Groesbeck v. Duluth S.S. & 
A.R. Co., 250 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1919). A quarter of a century 
later, the Court declared: "But where as here several classes 
of services have a common use of the same property difficul-
ties of separation are obvious. Allocation of costs is not a 
matter for the slide-rule. It involves judgment on a myriad 
of facts. It has no claim to an exact science. But 
neither does the separation of properties which are not in 
fact separable because they function as an integrated whole." 
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. F.P.C., 324 U.S. 581, 589 
(1945). See also, New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 
328 (1947)-.~The Interstate Commerce Commission has recognized 
the arbitrary nature "of any method of allocation" in cases 
"[w]here constant costs are joint or common and are indivis-
ible among the several services on any cost of service basis 
••• " Rules to Govern Assembling and Presentin Cost Evi-
dence, 337 I.C.C. 29 , 323 1970 • See also, Grain in Mul-
'fI"i)Te-Car Shipments--Ri ver Crossings tOthe South, 325 I. C. C. 
752, 772 ( 1965); United Fuel Gas Corp., 31 F.P.C. 1342, 1347 
(1964). 
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be used. [R. 688). 
The rates selected for competitive telephone service 
offerings based upon a long run incremental analysis and a 
unit incremental cost study do not wholly ignore these common 
overhead expenses. Because prices selected in this manner are 
not "based upon cost" alone, they are designed to optimize 
contribution which can be applied to the Company's common 
overhead expenses. [R. 281]. Therefore, it is incorrect to 
view Mountain Bell's proposed rates for business terminal 
equipment as making no contribution to these common overheads. 
Nevertheless, consistent with its strategy to cause Moun-
tain Bell's competitive rates to be fixed at a level far above 
the relevant costs of providing a telephone service, the Ap-
pellant argued that the Commission should adopt its so-called 
fully distributed cost model. However, the Appellant's cost 
study was carefully scrutinized in the record and it was shown 
that the Appellant's expert witness employed a fully distrib-
uted "cost plus" study. Mountain Bell's witness pointed out 
that the Appellant's cost study caused to be included as costs 
of Dimension 400 PBX and Com Key 2152 the costs of coin tele-
phone collections, armored car expenses, and other expenses 
that are clearly not attributable in any sense to terminal 
equipment. [R. 595-96; Applicant's Exhibit 28 "Twelve Faults 
With J. W. Wilson Cost Study" and Applicant's Exhibit 29 "Re-
turn on Investment"]. By including these random and 
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irrelevant expenses in its study as allegedly relevant costs 
of a private branch exchange (PBX), the Appellant could there-
upon argue that the rates for services such as Dimension 400 
PBX should be radically increased to cover these irrelevant 
costs. 
It was earlier indicated that the Appellant's strategy is 
not unique to this case. The Appellant's trade association 
co-members have made the same arguments through the same wit-
nesses urging adoption of a fully distributed "cost plus" 
study developed by the staff of the California Commission. 
Countless state regulatory commissions have rejected the 
Appellant's strategy and contentions. 
The North Carolina Utilities Commission in its final or-
der in Docket No. P-55, sub 754 on June 30, 1977 expressly re-
jected the intervenor's suggestion that a so-called fully dis-
tributed cost study, modeled after the California study, be 
used to calculate costs for Dimension 400 PBX service. Like 
the Utah Commission in this case, the North Carolina Commis-
sion approved the proposed rates based upon incremental costs 
and a long run incremental analysis: 
Southern Bell determined the costs of providing 
DIMENSION service based on cost studies which util-
ized a directly assignable cost approach. ·under 
this approach "general overheads" are not directly 
assigned to particular products or costs but are re-
covered in the "contribution," which represents the 
difference between the rates charged and the costs 
incurred. Complainants submitted a fully allocated 
cost study based on the methodology developed by the 
staff of the California Public Utilities Commission 
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in 1963. [T]he methodology employed in the 
Southern Bell cost study was a proper costing ap-
proach for pricing DIMENSION. Complainant's cost 
study for the DIMENSION also included a number of 
inappropriate calculations. The result is an inac-
curate cost study which cannot be relied upon as a 
basis for determining the reasonableness of the 
level of rates for DIMENSION service. 
In particular, Complainants' method of comput-
ing administration and maintenance factors is un-
realistic for the reason that the administration 
factor includes the cost of many items which have 
nothing to do with the provision of DIMENSION ser-
vice. Southern Bell's procedure of analyzing the 
specific service and developing its cost factors on 
that basis is the more logical and preferable ap-
proach. 
Southern Bell does not allocate items of "com-
mon overhead" in its cost study. Rather, the dif-
ference between direct costs and rates is the con-
tribution available to help pay for these costs. We 
find this to be a reasonable approach. (emphasis 
added). 
Similarly, the Illinois Commerce Commission, by Order 
dated December 21, 1977 in Docket Nos. 77-0033 & 59556; the 
Connecticut Commission, by Order dated January 17, 1977 in 
Docket No. 760719; and the Missouri Public Service Commission, 
by Order dated December 20, 1978 in Case No. 18565, all re-
jected the intervenor's fully distributed "cost plus" study 
and approved the use of incremental cos ts and a long run in-
cremental analysis. Most recently, the Maryland Public Ser-
vice Commission, by Order No. 63442 entered November 24, 1978 
in Case Nos. 6936 & 7022, approved and adopted the Hearing Ex-
aminer's Proposed Order and flatly repudiated the intervenor's 
fully distributed cost study: 
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A significant difference between the cost study 
prepared by Mr. Galligan [expert witness for the in-
tervenors] and the study prepared by Mr. Hudson [ex-
pert witness for C & P], relates to the fact that 
the former (a Fully Distributed Cost study) attempt-
ed to allocate common overheads to the cost of DI-
MENSION service, while the latter (an Incremental 
Cost study) included only those costs which were 
directly attributable to DIMENSION service. 
* * * 
The Company has developed its rates for DIMEN-
SION service on the basis of incremental costs; that 
is, the additional costs incurred in offering a par-
ticular service. According to C & P, it is inappro-
priate to use the Fully Distributed Cost methodology 
in determining prices for individual services, since 
that methodology precludes consideration of competi-
tive market conditions, elasticity of demand, and 
optimalization of contribution to basic service. 
Moreover, C & P has argued that it is necessary to 
use incremental costs in order to determine whether 
or not the rate level for a particular service will 
place a cost burden on subscribers to other ser-
vices; if a rate level recovers all direct costs, it 
will not constitute a cost burden on other services. 
The issue as to whether the use of the Fully 
Distributed Cost or the Incremental Cost methodology 
is more appropriate in establishing the rates for 
DIMENSION PBX equipment has been thoroughly argued 
by the parties to this proceeding. • [T]he record 
supports [the conclusion that] C & P's Incremental 
Cost methodology is, in part, an outgrowth of its 
overall rate philosophy of having vertical services 
such as DIMENSION PBX equipment make a maximum con-
tribution towards supporting basic telephone ser-
vice. Under this rate making policy, if the rates 
f'Cir-"a particular vertical service recover all direct 
costs and make a contribution toward offsetting com-
mon overheads, the offering of that service will not 
burden other telephone subscribers. On the 
contrary, the offering of such service at that rate 
level will benefit other telephone subscribers since 
it will offset certain common costs that these 
customers would have otherwise borne. 
Moreover the use of Full Costs is 
e service eing 
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offered is subject to competitive market conditions. 
Under such circumstances, the use of this cost meth-
odology may act as an artificial barrier for entry 
into the market when a lesser competitive rate would 
still recover all direct costs associated with that 
service and produce a contribution toward common 
overheads. In the unregulated sector, a corporation 
will offer a new product at a price that will re-
cover all direct costs and make the maximum contri-
bution toward defraying common costs. To do other-
wise would be to forego an opportunity to recover 
costs which would then have to be recovered in the 
prices of other products. In the case of C & P, to 
require the use of Fully Distributed Costs in priC:-
~ competitive products such as DIMENSION PBX 
equipment would result in a greater proportion of 
common costs being recovered through rates for basic 
telephone service. (emphasis added). 
Significantly, the strategy of the Appellant's trade 
association co-members to force the prices of the local 
telephone utility to protectionist, umbrella prices for the 
benefit of private vendors and lessors in proceedings such as 
this has not gone unnoticed by state commissions. In re-
jecting the intervenor's so-called fully distributed cost 
approach, the Connecticut Commission concluded: "It is not 
the function of this agency to protect the competitors from 
the regulated utility but rather to assure that consumers are 
provided the best quality service at the lowest possible 
price." Decision at p. 5, Docket No. 760719 (Jan. 17, 1977), 
The District of Columbia Commission also rejected the inter-
venor's attempted strategy to show that the telephone utility 
should be required to charge higher prices for Dimension PBX 
service based upon the intervenor's fully distributed "cost 
plus" study: 
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This Commission will not increase a regulated 
utility's prices artificially in order to protect 
other companies from price competition. Not only is 
~o-called "umbrella pricing" bad regulatory policy; 
it also leads to a mis-allocation of resources. 
Either way, the consumer is the loser. 
Order No. 5870 at p. 13, Docket No. TT76-18 
(Mar. 30, 1977), aff'd, Order No. 5874 (Apr. 
29, 1977), petition for reconsideration denied, 
Order No. 5889 (Jun. 22, 1977). 
Notwithstanding the Appellant's contention that competi-
tive prices for telephone equipment should be based upon the 
Appellant's fully distributed "cost plus" study, the Utah 
Commission concluded and ruled, as early as 1974, that "a 
public utility may utilize an incremental cost approach •• 
in fixing rates and tariffs for equipment offered in a competi-
tive market." Report and Order, I. & S. Docket No. 155 (Jan. 
7, 1974). Notwithstanding the Appellant's contention, the un-
rebutted evidence of record shows that Mountain Bell's ap-
proved rates in this case exceed relevant incremental costs by 
a margin of from 18 percent to 242 percent. [R. 479-80]. 
In spite of the fact that the evidence shows that fully 
distributed costs furnish an improper basis for pricing com-
petitive products, Mountain Bell introduced as additional evi-
dence a fully distributed cost study to demonstrate conclu-
sively that the proposed and now approved rates exceed all 
fully distributed costs as well. [Applicant's Exhibit 20]. 
Mountain Bell's witness, Mr. Glenn Brown, explained that a 
fully distributed cost study properly accounts for only two 
additional cost factors over and above basic incremental 
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costs. These two factors, for the purpose of identifying 
common overhead expenses, were: (1) an allocation of Mountain 
Bell's common overheads, expressed as a percentage of Utah 
capital investment and represented by a factor of 3. 5% [ R. 
882]; and (2) an allocation of the costs associated with all 
services performed by AT&T and by Bell Telephone Laboratories 
for AT&T, expressed as a 2% license contract fee factor. [Tr. 
885]. Both of these cost factors were included in Mountain 
Bell's fully distributed cost study to show that the proposed 
and approved rates in fact recovered more than their propor-
tionate share of common overhead expenses of the company. The 
evidence shows that the rates exceed these fully distributed 
costs by a margin of from 7 percent to 216 percent. [Appli-
cant's Exhibit 20]. 
In spite of evidence to the contrary, the Appellant con-
tends that the approved rates do not cover common overhead ex-
penses which could be allocated to competitive services. In 
Mountain Bell's fully distributed cost study, the 3.5% factor 
includes the following items of common overhead expense: 
( 1) Maintenance of headquarters building and 
general office buildings to include heating, light-
ing and air conditioning [R. 881]; 
(2) Depreciation and amortization of those 
buildings [R. 881]; 
(3) Return on building investment [R. 882]; 
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( 4) Interest on capital and net income [R. 
882]; 
( 5) Property taxes on those buildings [R. 
882]; 
(6) Executive salaries and Treasury Department 
expenses [R. 882]; and 
(7) Lawyers' fees [R. 882]. 
The second allocation for overhead expenses made in 
Mountain Bell's fully distributed cost study was for expenses 
incurred by AT&T and Bell Labs in connection with general 
service assistance and implementation. Allocations of these 
expenses were made and included in the cost study as a license 
contract fee. The Appellant's strategy in advocating the use 
of a fully distributed "cost plus" approach is vividly illus-
trated by the Appellant's proposed treatment of these ex-
penses. For example, rather than allocating all such expenses 
among all PBXs, the Appellant contended that a $10 million ex-
pense for fundamental research and development performed by 
Bell Labs and requested and paid for by AT&T in connection 
with all PBX development should be treated as a cost of only 
Dimension 400 PBX and recovered in its price. [Intervenor's 
Exhibit 8 at 28]. The Appellant also contended that an 
expense of $2. 6 million incurred by AT&T for general services 
to the operating companies in implementing all Dimension 
services (including Dimension 100 PBX, Dimension 400 PBX, and 
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Dimension 2000 PBX) should all be treated as costs of only 
Dimension 400 PBX and recovered in its price. [Intervenor's 
Exhibit 8]. 
For purposes of allocating these expenses ratably, a 
factor of 2% was included in Mountain Bell's fully distributed 
cost study [R. 885] in spite of the fact that the factor 
should only have been one-half of 1% to account for these 
common expenses. [R. 895; Applicant's Exhibits 24 & 25]. 
Notwithstanding Mountain Bell's overstatement of these common 
cos ts, the record demonstrates that Mountain Bell's approved 
rates exceed fully distributed costs by a substantial margin. 
[R. 883-84]. 
That record evidence makes it clear, therefore, that the 
approved rates cover and exceed both incremental and fully 
distributed costs. In its final decision, the Commission 
specifically reviewed this evidence and observed that "Mr. 
Brown [Mountain Bell's witness] further presented a Fully 
Distributed Cost (FDC) study which showed further that Moun-
tain Bell's proposed tariffs covered all of the identifiable 
costs [incremental costs] associated with the provision of 
these services plus an allocated part of the general costs of 
the Company." [Report and Order at 7, R. 1140]. On the basis 
of the substantial evidence and the Commission's own evalua-
tion of that evidence, it was concluded by the Commission 
that: 
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6. The tariffs, filed by Mountain Bell with 
this Commission covering the Dimension 400 PBX, the 
ComKey 2152 • • are priced at a level which will 
recover for Mountain Bell all of its costs asso-
ciated with the provision ofSaid products and ser-
vices. 
Report and Order at 11, [R. 1142]. 
added). 
(emphasis 
3. Mountain Bell's Approved Rates, Based Upon a Long 
Run Incremental Analysis and Incremerit;al Costs, Do 
Not Result in Cross-Subsidization. 
The third imagined fault with the use of incremental 
costs and a long run incremental analysis is the Appellant's 
contrived suggestion that the approved rates fail to cover all 
relevant costs and that competitive telephone services will 
require cross-subsidization from monopoly residential rate-
payers. This speculative objection finds no foundation in the 
record however. The evidence shows that the approved rates 
cover and exceed both incremental and fully distributed costs. 
[Applicant's Exhibit 20; R. 883-84]. 
As a general objection to incremental costs and a long 
run incremental analysis, a vast number of state commissions 
in other Dimension cases such as this have flatly rejected the 
Appellant's unsupported theory that cross-subsidization will 
result. For example, the Connecticut Commission recognized 
that the substantial contribution generated from rates sug-
gested by a long run incremental analysis will not result in a 
need for cross-subsidization: 
The long run incremental analysis indicates an 
acceptable cumulative discounted cash flow rate of 
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return, sufficient to provide revenue contribution 
rather than to require cross-subsidization. 
Docket No. 760719 (Jan. 17, 1977) (emphasis 
added). 
The Missouri Public Service Commission similarly rejected the 
claim that failure to use the intervenor's fully distributed 
"cost plus" study and reliance upon incremental costs and a 
long run incremental analysis for pricing competitive tele-
phone services will result in cross-subsidization: 
[C]ontribution • • provides the Company with 
revenue to offset the common overhead expenses of 
the business, thereby reducing the revenue re-
quirement on basic exchange service-TT.e., monopoly 
residential service]. 
Report and Order, Case No. 18565, p.4 (Nov. 20, 
1978) (emphasis added). 
The Public Service Commission of Maryland also found that 
setting competitive rates and tariffs on the basis of a long 
run incremental analysis maximizes contribution and thereby 
benefits subscribers of monopoly services: 
[I]f the rates for a particular vertical 
service [i.e., a competitive business service] 
recover all direct [incremental] costs and make a 
contribution toward offset ting common overheads, the 
offering of such service will not burden other 
telephone subscribers. On the contrary, the 
offering of such service at that rate level wTIT 
benefit other telephone subscribers since it will 
offset certain common costs that these customers 
would have otherwise borne. 
Order No. 63442, pp. 17-18, Case Nos. 6936 & 
7022 (Nov. 24, 1978) (emphasis added). 
The Public Utility Commission of Texas, on January 15, 1979, 
ruled that Southwestern Bell's use of unit incremental costs 
did not result in a need for cross-subsidization: 
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Southwestern Bell's "incremental unit cost" analysis 
does not result in cross-subsidization • • • and 
does not tend to restrict or impair competition. 
Examiner's Report Amended to Conform to Commis-
sion Findings in Open Meeting, Docket No. 156, 
p.13 (emphasis added). 
Finally, the standard announced by the Utah Commission has 
been met in this case: 
In fixing rates and tariffs for equipment offered in 
a competitive market a public utility may utilize an 
incremental cost approach in determining whether or 
not its costs are being covered by a given rate and 
whether or not a contribution is being made to the 
general overhead of the utility for the benefit of 
the customers of its monopoly service. If all of 
the costs associated with the addition of a particu-
lar item of equipment are covered by its price and a 
contribution is also being made to the fixed costs 
and expenses of the utility then the customers of 
the monopoly service will be benefited. 
Report and Order, Investigation & Suspension 
Docket No. 155 (Jan. 7, 1974). 
There is in short no competent evidence or authority to sus-
tain the Appellant's contention that cross-subsidization from 
monopoly residential services will be necessary to cover rev-
enue deficiencies resulting from the approved business rates 
established on the basis of a long run incremental analysis 
and incremental, direct costs. 
4. Mountain Bell's Use of Incremental Cost Studies 
and a Long Run TnCremental Analysis to Select 
the -Approvecr--Rates for Cpmpetitive Business 
Telephone Services Do Not Violate The Antitrust 
Laws. 
The Appellant makes a belated attempt to argue that rates 
established by a long run incremental analysis and unit incre-
mental costs violate the antitrust laws. [Appellant's Brief 
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at 44-47]. The groundlessness of this proposition is matched 
only by the irrelevancy of the cases cited by the Appellant in 
support of it. 
The Appellant quotes from the decision in Northern 
Pacific Ry. Co. ~State of North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585 (1915) 
in an at tempt to show that use of incremental cos ts, instead 
of fully distributed costs, results in non-compensatory rates 
which violate the anti trust laws. However, in that case, the 
railway claimed that the state railway commission had approved 
rates for hauling coal which were confiscatory under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. There was no 
contention or finding that these facts stated a claim under 
the anti trust laws, and in fact the anti trust laws did not 
serve as a jurisdictional basis for the action. The Supreme 
Court concluded only that the railway should be permitted to 
realize a return on its rates for hauling coal at levels 
greater than incremental costs. The decision in Northern 
Pacific is factually and legally irrelevant to the issues in 
this case. The evidence of record here conclusively demon-
strates that the approved rates for competitive business tele-
phone services are not priced "at cost," "based upon cost," or 
"equal to cost." [R. 54; 59]. In fact the approved rates ex-
ceed not only incremental costs by a margin of from 18 percent 
to 242 percent, but they also exceed fully distributed costs 
by a margin of from 7 percent to 216 percent. [ R. 4 79-80 i 
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Applicant's Exhibit 20]. The approved rates are neither con-
fiscatory nor violations of the antitrust laws under the 
authority of Northern Pacific. 
A second case relied upon by the Appellant is equally in-
appos i te. The decision in American Commercial Lines, Inc. ~ 
Louisville & Nashville B..!- Co., 392 U.S. 571 ( 1968) was based 
upon a federal statute which required the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) to adopt and approve rates which guaranteed 
the presence of and protection of all transportation competi-
tors in the market [49 U.S.C. §1 et seq.], i.e., a federal 
statutory mandate for "umbrella pricing." To support umbrella 
prices, the ICC was obliged to rely upon "cost-plus" studies 
in justification therefor. This case neither represents the 
law which presently governs ICC deliberations nor does it have 
any significance for state telephone ratemaking purposes. In 
fact, the ICC has now repudiated its reliance upon "umbrella 
pricing" and fully distributed "cost-plus" studies and has 
sanctioned and adopted the use of incremental costs for regu-
lated companies who offer goods or services in a competitive 
market. "[T]he ICC has used an incremental cost standard to 
measure the reasonableness of rates where the regulated modes 
of transportation face competition from unregulated suppliers. 
. • • [I]t has rarely denied a rate reduction which meets the 
standards of incremental cost analysis." Baumol & Walton, 
"Full Costing, Competition and Regulatory Practice," 82 YALE 
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L.J. 639, 653-54 (1973). See, Wine, Pacific Coast to the 
East, 329 I.C.C. 167, 171 (1966); Wooden Furniture, El 
Segundo, ~to Chicago, Ill., 332 I.C.C. 37 (Div. 2, 1967). 
With respect to rate setting for business telephone ser-
vices in the competitive market, an overwhelming number of 
state commissions have rejected the Appellant's suggestion 
that "umbrella prices" must be adopted to protect the unregu-
lated vendors and lessors of telephone equipment. These com-
missions have categorically refused to "increase a regulated 
[telephone] utility's prices artificially in order to protect 
other companies from price competition." Order No. 5870, 
Docket No. TT76-18 (D.C. Public Service Commission Mar. 30, 
1977), aff'd, Order No. 5874 (Apr. 29, 1977), petition for 
reconsideration denied, Order No. 5889 (Jun. 22, 1977). See 
also, Decision at 5, Docket No. 760719 (Conn. Public Utilities 
Authority Jan. 17, 1977). 
The other decisions cited by the Appellant in support of 
its proposition that rates based upon incremental costs vio-
late the antitrust laws are equally inapplicable. The deci-
sion in Inglis ! Sons Baking Co. ~ ITT Continental Baking 
Co., 389 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. Cal. 1975), cited by the Appel-
lant, was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 526 
F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975). In Tri-Q, Inc.~ Sta-Hi Corp., 45 
Cal. Rptr. 878, 404 P.2d 486 (1965), the California Supreme 
Court observed only that fully distributed cost studies were 
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lawful under the state Unfair Practices Act. It made no ob-
serva ti on or ruling with respect to the use of incremental 
costs. The court's decision in Northern States Power Co. v. 
City of St. Paul, 99 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1959) considered a 
utility's claim that the rates approved for gas service were 
confiscatory. The court concluded only that the gas rates 
were confiscatory, irrespective of whether fully distributed 
or incremental costs were used. The decision in St. Michaels 
Utilities Commission v. Federal Power Commission, 377 F.2d 912 
(4th Cir. 1967) considered only whether different rates 
charged to Tariff Customers and Cooperative Customers were un-
lawfully discriminatory under Section 205 (b) of the Federal 
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §824d(b). Whether the Federal Power Com-
mission could approve rates based upon incremental costs was 
not an issue, and in fact that Commission advocates the use of 
incremental costs today. Baumol & Walton, "Full Costing, Com-
petition and Regulatory Practice," 82 YALE L. J. 639, 649-51 
(1973). Finally, the opinion in Payne.!.!_ Washington Metropol-
itan Area Transit Commission, 415 F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1968) 
considered neither the virtues of fully distributed costs nor 
the federal antitrust laws. 
Conversely, Mountain Bell's authority in support of the 
use of incremental costs is conclusive. Pacific Engineering ! 
Production v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977), 
~· denied, 434 U.S. 879. The case addresses the propriety 
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and legality of both fully distributed and incremental costs. 
More importantly, the decision specifically addresses the is-
sue of the applicability or non-applicability of the antitrust 
laws to the use of cost studies. 
Pacific Engineering, a single product firm, and Kerr-
McGee (successor to American Potash and Chemical Company 
[hereinafter AMPOT]), a multi-product firm, were both engaged 
in the production of ammonium perchlorate, a chemical used 
almost exclusively as an oxidizer in solid rocket fuel. The 
ultimate consumer of this chemical was the federal government. 
Between 1954 and 1963, demand for the chemical was substantial 
because of the development of Minuteman, Poseidon, and Titan 
missiles. AMPOT was the only producer of ammonium perchlorate 
in the period of 1954 to 1957. After 1958, three other firms 
entered the market. Beginning in 1964, demand for the chemi-
cal declined because of NASA's conversion from solid to liquid 
rocket fuel and because of the di version of federal monies 
from missile programs to the Vietnam war. After the year 
1966, because of the sharp decline in demand for the chemical, 
competitive prices also fell. As a single product firm, 
Pacific Engineering priced its product based upon its fully 
distributed costs, also called its average total cost. As a 
multi-product firm, AMPOT priced its product based upon its 
average variable cost, analogous to incremental costs. 
AMPOT's prices were well below its average total cost but they 
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were above its average variable cost. 
The Tenth Circuit defined average total cost (analogous 
to fully distributed cost) as "the sum of fixed cost and total 
variable cost divided by output. Fixed costs are those ex-
penses which do not vary with changes in output, including 
most management expenses, interest on bonded debt, deprecia-
tion of plant and equipment, property taxes, and other irre-
ducible overhead. Variable costs are those which vary with 
changes in output, such as labor, material, fuel, etc." 551 
F.2d at 792 n.2. Average variable cost (analogous to incre-
mental cost) was defined as "the sum of all variable costs 
divided by output" such as labor, fuel, material, etc. 551 
F.2d at 792 n.3. 
As a result of the different cost methodologies used by 
the two competitors, AMPOT successfully outbid Pacific Engi-
neering for government contracts with the result that Pacific 
Engineering finally left the market. Pacific Engineering 
attempted to impute sinister motives to AMPOT, alleging that 
it had been foreclosed from the market because of the cost 
methodology employed by AMPOT. It was Pacific Engineering's 
contention that AMP OT should have raised its prices to a non-
competitive "umbrella" level in order to save its smaller, 
under-capitalized rival. However, in rejecting that conten-
tion, the Tenth Circuit explicitly recognized that the anti-
trust laws are not designed to protect individual competitors: 
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As we said in Atlas Building Products Co. v. Diamond 
Block & Gravel---CO:-, 269 F.2d 950, 9~ITTth Cir. 
T959T, - cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843: 'Antitrust 
legislation is concerned primarily with the health 
of the competitive process, not with the individual 
competitor who must sink or swim in competitive en-
terprise.' In an industry plagued by falling demand 
and excess capacity, the sinking of a competitor may 
be an indication of a healthy competitive process. 
551 F.2d at 795. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding AMPOT's dominant market share, 
the Court concluded that AMPOT possessed the right to compete 
with smaller single product firms free of legally-imposed 
restraints: "Bigness. is not a disqualification to 
compete." Id. at 799. 
The trial court found that AM POT' s sales were always at 
prices above average variable cost and "contributed to the 
company's cash flow." These prices also were above AMPOT's 
marginal cost. Id. at 797. Based upon these findings, the 
Tenth Circuit found nothing unlawful about AMPOT's pricing 
policies. Id. at 797. 
This recent decision confirms the propriety of Mountain 
Bell's incremental cost analysis as a multi-product firm. It 
holds that a multi-product company, like Mountain Bell, ought 
not to be forced to price on a fully distributed cost basis 
similar to its smaller single-product competitors, since this 
results in the artificial protection of a competitor to the 
exclusion of natural competitive forces in the marketplace. 
Mountain Bell's proposed tariffs exceed its incremental costs 
by a substantial margin; the Tenth Circuit has expressly 
-78-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--
concluded that this pricing does not violate the federal anti-
trust laws. 
The Appellant struggles, unsuccessfully, to distinguish 
the decision in Pacific Engineering from the instant case. 
While acknowledging the validity of the decision, the Appel-
lant fabricates the theory that it is . nevertheless unlawful 
for that portion of the regulated telephone services (i.e., 
residential monopoly services) to cross-subsidize competitive 
regulated telephone services (i.e., business services) whose 
rates cover only incremental costs. However, the evidence of 
record and the decisions of many other state commissions in 
related proceedings show that these are not the facts in this 
case. The evidence shows that the approved rates exceed both 
incremental and fully distributed costs. The evidence further 
shows that residential services will not cross-subsidize com-
petitive business services. In fact, the converse is true: 
competitive business services will cross-subsidize residential 
services through the substantial contribution generated from 
the approved rates. The decision in Pacific Engineering 
stands for the proposition that prices, based upon incremental 
cos ts, are legal in spite of the fact that a competitor may 
have to price based upon fully distributed costs. Mountain 
Bell's approved rates in this case not only satisfy that legal 
test but they go even further. They exceed fully distributed 
costs as well. 
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The Appellant's ill-founded and unsupported objections 
are consistent with neither the evidence of record nor the 
controlling legal authorities. They are consistent only with 
the appellant's strategy to establish artificially high um-
brella prices for Mountain Bell's business telephone services 
to guarantee that unregulated vendors and lessors will not be 
subject to competition from Mountain Bell. The Appellant and 
its trade association co-members urged the Federal Communica-
tions Commission to permit them to compete with the telephone 
utility for the business telephone customer. They are now, 
and have been, engaged in a methodical strategy to persuade 
state public utilities commissions to protect them from com-
petition by the telephone utility. Not surprisingly, an em-
ployee and witness for the Appellant testified in this pro-
ceeding that the Utah Commission should plan, in the long run, 
to phase Mountain Bell out of t.he terminal equipment business 
altogether. [R. 241]. The Commission ultimately understood 
the Appellant's strategy in this case and the Commission re-
jected it based upon the evidence of record. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the Appellant did not comply with the 
statute to perfect a timely appeal of the Commission's final 
Report and Order in this matter. This Court, therefore, has 
no subject matter jurisdiction in this case and the Writ of 
Certiorari must be dismissed. 
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It is also clear that the Commission's findings and con-
clusions are supported by substantial competent evidence of 
record and by overwhelming legal authority. Mountain Bell has 
demonstrated that the Appellant's objections are contrived and 
that they are negated by substantial evidence to the contrary. 
Moreover, the same objections and speculative arguments ad-
vanced by the Appellant's trade association co-members have 
been considered and repudiated by countless state regulatory 
commissions in similar proceedings. Based upon the substan-
tial evidence and legal authority in support of the Commis-
sion 's findings and conclusions, it is incumbent upon this 
Court to enter its Order affirming the final Report and Order 
of the Public Service Commission. 
Dated this 30th day of March, 1979. 
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